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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Silk Road linking the ancient world’s civilizations wound through deserts and
mountain passes, traversed by caravans laden with the world’s treasures. The modern Silk
Road winds its way through undersea fiber optic cables and satellite links, ferrying
electrons brimming with information. This electronic Silk Road makes possible trade in
services heretofore impossible in human history. Radiologists, accountants, engineers,
lawyers, musicians, filmmakers, and reporters now offer their services to the world,
without boarding a plane (or passing a customs checkpoint). Like the ancient Silk Road,
† Visiting Professor, The University of Chicago Law School; Professor, University of
California, Davis. Yale Law School, J.D. 1992; Harvard College, B.A. 1989. I am grateful to
Susan Crawford, Tino Cuéllar, Harold Koh, Mark Lemley, Daniel Markovits, Adam Muchmore,
Michael Reisman, Alec Stone Sweet, Madhavi Sunder, and commentators at the Berkman Center
Cyberlaw Retreat, the Law and Globalization Seminar at Yale Law School, the Law, Science, and
Technology Program at Stanford Law School, the Harvard-MIT-Yale Cyberscholar Workshop,
and faculty workshops at the University of Connecticut, Emory University, Florida State
University, Northwestern University, University of Oregon, UC Davis, UCLA, the University of
Chicago, and Washington University (St. Louis) law schools. Thanks also to excellent research
assistants Audrey Goodwater, Jessica Karbowski, Kathryn Lee, and Janice Ta, and needle-in-ahaystack librarian Erin Murphy. Special thanks to Connie Chan and Stratos Pahis for
extraordinary editing.
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which transformed the lands that it connected, this new trade route promises to remake
the world.
This radical shift in the provision of services 1 becomes possible because of
advances in telecommunications technologies. This is the rapidly growing phenomenon I
call net-work—information services delivered remotely through electronic
communications systems. Net-work encompasses not just the services outsourced to
Accra, Bangalore or Manila, but also the online services supplied by Silicon Valley to the
world. Apple, eBay, and Yahoo too are exporters of information services, revealing the
Internet to be a global trading platform. Silicon Valley enterprises serve as the world’s
retailers, librarians, advertising agencies, television producers, auctioneers, and even
romance matchmakers. These enterprises seek to become middlemen to the world. Half
of Google’s earnings are now generated overseas. 2 Once theorized as nontradable, 3
services now join goods in the global marketplace, allowing workers in developing
countries to participate in lucrative Western markets despite immigration barriers and
allowing Western enterprises to reach a global audience, often free of tariffs.
But the existing infrastructure of trade, developed over the centuries for a
paradigm of goods, proves inadequate either to enable or to regulate this emerging Trade,
version 2.0. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and regional arrangements such as
the European Union, NAFTA, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
commit nations to liberalize barriers to trade in services, but these broad mandates have
found little elaboration to date. Net-work companies, lacking legal precedents or
authoritative guidance, must innovate not only technological methods and business
models, but also legal structures that span the globe. Net-work trade has yet to develop
counterparts to the lex mercatoria, bills of lading, and conventions on contracting which
emerged over centuries of experience with trade in goods.
1. The Economist famously offers a quip, in lieu of a definition, for services, describing
them as “[p]roducts of economic activity that you can’t drop on your foot.” Economics A-Z,
ECONOMIST, http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=S#services
(last visited Apr. 18, 2009) (quoting MATTHEW BISHOP, ESSENTIAL ECONOMICS 239 (2004)).
International trade agreements, including the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), eschew a definition of services, and I
will follow suit because a precise definition proves elusive. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK &
ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 350 (3d ed. 2005) (noting a lack
of “consensus within the economic literature” on the definition of services). Consider, for
example, the issue of whether magazines are a good or a service—a question raised in a recent
World Trade Organization dispute. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures
Concerning Periodicals, 17, WT/DS31/AB/R (June 30, 1997) (“[A] periodical is a good
comprised of two components: editorial content and advertising content. Both components can be
viewed as having services attributes, but they combine to form a physical product—the periodical
itself.”).
2. GOOGLE INC., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2009) (“International revenues accounted for
approximately 51% of our total revenues in 2008.”).
3. This view of services as not transmissible over long distances remained popular into the
1970s. See Jagdish Bhagwati, International Trade in Services and Its Relevance for Economic
Development, in THE EMERGING SERVICES ECONOMY 3, 3 (Orio Giarini ed., 1987) (critiquing
“haircuts view of services,” meaning services that “cannot be had long distance”).
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Yet, the pressure on law from cyberspace trade is clear. Consider some recent
transnational flashpoints: Antigua’s WTO challenge to U.S. rules barring online
gambling; the outsourcing of radiology to India; Brazil’s demands to Google to identify
perpetrators of hate speech; and an Alien Torts Statute suit charging Yahoo with abetting
torture in China. Most recently, the United States complained to the WTO that Chinese
state media controls on foreign movies, music (such as iTunes), and financial information
violate free trade commitments.4 These cases reveal the unsettled legal issues at stake in
cyber-trade, from jurisdiction to protectionism, from consumer protection to human
rights.
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage applies, of course, to all trade,
whether trade in goods or trade in information.5 Services constitute an increasing bulk of
human economic activity.6 By 2007, the value of trade in commercial services was close
to three trillion dollars, some one-fifth of all world trade.7 Yet, for much of its history,
the legal regime governing international trade neglected services in favor of liberalizing
commerce in goods. But as Western economies became increasingly service-oriented,
they began to recognize the opportunities for export in telecommunications, media,
financial, and other services.8 Their efforts in the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
4. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting Trading
Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, WT/DS363/1 (Apr. 16, 2007). The European Union, Australia, Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan have reserved their rights in the dispute, and the WTO constituted a panel on March 27,
2008. Summary of the Dispute, WT/DS363, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu_e/cases_e/ds363_e.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). The United States and the European
Union have also brought complaints against Chinese financial information regulations. Request
for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting Financial Information
Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers, WT/DS373/1 (Mar. 5, 2008); Request for
Consultations by the European Communities, China—Measures Affecting Financial Information
Services and Foreign Financial Information Suppliers, WT/DS372/1 (Mar. 5, 2008).
5. Jagdish Bhagwati, Arvind Panagariya & T.N. Srinivasan, The Muddles over Outsourcing,
J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2004, at 93, 112 (concluding that outsourcing, defined as services traded
internationally at arm’s length, has “effects that are not qualitatively different from those of
conventional trade in goods” and “leads to gains from trade and increases in national income,
with the caveats that are standard in this literature”). But compare Paul A. Samuelson, Where
Ricardo and Mill Rebut and Confirm Arguments of Mainstream Economists Supporting
Globalization, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2004, at 135 (arguing that changing terms of trade over
the long term might result in real per capita income loss for a country like the United States), with
Arvind Panagariya, Why the Recent Samuelson Article Is NOT About Offshore Outsourcing,
http://www.columbia.edu/~ap2231/
Policy%20Papers/Samuelson%20JEP%20(Summer%202004)_Not%20on%20Outsourcing.htm
(last visited Apr. 18, 2009) (arguing that Samuelson misapplies changing terms of trade model to
outsourcing).
6. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK ATLAS 36 (2004) (“The service sector now accounts for
two-thirds of global economic output.”).
7. WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 6
(2007).
8. Businessmen from three proudly “American” corporations—American Insurance Group,
American Express, and PanAm—propelled the U.S. government in the 1970s to seek to liberalize
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resulted—over developing country opposition—in the GATS, forming one pillar of the
WTO established in 1995. GATS subjected services for the first time to the international
trade regime’s far-reaching disciplines. 9 Regional arrangements go further still. The
European Union has ambitiously declared a Single European Market, seeking “an area
without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital is ensured.”10 Both NAFTA11 and the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR)12 require national treatment and market access for service providers across
their respective regions. America’s new bilateral free trade agreements with Australia,
Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, Oman, and Singapore all include broad obligations to liberalize
services.13 Southeast Asian nations have promised to create a free trade zone including
services by 2012.14
The coming of international trade disciplines to services is fiercely contested.
Some worry that liberalization will erode the wages or threaten the livelihoods of workers
now forced to compete on a global stage.15 Others see a gathering threat to law itself.16
Will work be outsourced to jurisdictions without adequate legal protections? While there
have been earlier eras of globalization, characterized by global flows of people, goods,
and capital,17 the globalization of services today poses a unique challenge to regulation:
when individuals migrated to provide services, they could be expected to conform to the
laws of their new home; but net-work enables individuals to provide services around the
world without leaving their home jurisdiction. In such an environment, can nations still
regulate services?

trade in services. GEZA FEKETEKUTY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES: AN OVERVIEW AND
BLUEPRINT FOR NEGOTIATIONS 299-308 (1988).
9. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments—Results of the
Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1167 [hereinafter GATS].
10. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 14, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340)
3.
11. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1202, Dec. 17, 1992, 107
Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
12. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Costa
Rica-Dom. Rep.-El Sal.-Guat.-Hond.-Nicar., arts. 3.2, 10, 11.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.9(1), Aug. 5, 2004,
43
I.L.M.
514,
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/
CAFTA/CAFTA_DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
13. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
14. Associated Press, Asean, U.S. Sign Agreement To Expand Trade and Investment, Aug.
25, 2006, available at http://www.trade.hochiminhcity.gov.vn/data/ttth/2006/20060830-nw-inusaasian.htm [hereinafter Asean].
15. See Jeff Fleischer, Exporting America: An Interview With Lou Dobbs, MOTHER JONES,
Feb. 7, 2005, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2005/02/exporting-america-interview-loudobbs.
16. See Public Citizen, Offshoring and Privacy Protection, http://www.citizen.org/trade/
offshoring/privacy (last visited Apr. 18, 2009) (describing threats to privacy of Americans).
17. See generally Niall Ferguson, Sinking Globalization, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2005, at
64 (2005) (describing “mobility of commodities, capital, and labor” at the turn of the twentieth
century).
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The critics’ concerns cannot be dismissed as merely protectionism in disguise.
The jurisdiction-hopping implicit in net-work carries serious risks. Consider Kazaa, the
leading peer-to-peer file trading system, founded in the Netherlands by a Swede and a
Dane, but programmed from Estonia, and now run from Australia and incorporated in the
South Pacific nation of Vanuatu.18 Or the online gambling site PartyGaming, which, from
its headquarters in Gibraltar, manages computer servers on a Mohawk Indian reserve in
Canada, a London marketing office, and a workforce based mainly in Hyderabad, India.19
Of course, where regulation is oppressive and contrary to human rights, such evasion
should be encouraged, not condemned. But for liberal democratic states, the ability to
exploit the net to perform an end run around local law is deeply troubling. Left
unattended, footloose net-work might imperil domestic laws, replacing local law with the
regulation, if any, of the net-work provider’s home state. I will argue that the importing of
services should not require us to import law as well.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II reviews recent flashpoints in cyber-trade,
which demonstrate both the need to remove legal obstacles to cyber-trade and the need to
protect the capacity of states to regulate themselves. Part III offers principles that seek to
achieve this balance. Freeing cyber-trade will require a commitment to two principles: (1)
a technological neutrality principle that rejects attempts to bar net-work simply on the
grounds that it might allow some violations of local norms; and (2) a dematerialization
principle by which states undertake to dematerialize the services infrastructure—that is,
to make physical presence unnecessary for authentication, notification, certification,
inspection, and even dispute resolution.
But the footloose nature of cyber-trade raises the specter of two races to the
bottom: a deregulated world where service providers decamp to minimally regulated
jurisdictions from which they supply the world; and an overly regulated world where
some service providers eager to maximize revenues become complicit in state repression.
To curtail the race to the deregulated bottom, I argue for legal glocalization—requiring a
global service to conform to local rules when both the rules and their application to a
particular transaction are consistent with international legal norms. Glocalization rejects
protectionism, yet maintains local safeguards over culture and security; it helps resolve
the dilemma of net-work, navigating between the Scylla of protectionism and the
Charybdis of laissez faire. But will this assertion of local law tear apart the global web
into local fiefdoms? International and domestic law constrain excessive extraterritoriality
while international trade law counsels us to work towards global standards.
Harmonization of standards will prove essential to advancing trade in cyberspace. To
disrupt the race to the oppressive bottom, I argue that cyber-traders should establish
ground rules to, at a minimum, do no evil. Given that authoritarian regimes function by
18. See Todd Woody, The Race To Kill Kazaa, WIRED, Feb. 2003, at 104, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.02/kazaa.html;
Anupam
Chander,
Next
Stop,
Kazaakhstan? The Legal Globe-trotting of Kazaa, the Post-Napster File Sharing Company,
FINDLAW’S WRIT, Oct. 24, 2002,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20021024_chander.html.
19. Nils Pratley, The Porn Princess, the Indian Computer Whizz and the Poker Bet That
Made $10bn, GUARDIAN (London), June 3, 2005, at 3, available at
http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/ 0,,1498266,00.html.
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repressing information, information service providers will always be the locus of such
repression—and the potential route for subversion.

II.

TRADE 2.0’S CHALLENGE TO LAW

Through the Khyber Pass or around the Cape of Good Hope, merchants have long
made arduous journeys laden with the world’s treasures. Trade law developed with such
merchants in mind. Law accommodated trade conducted over the high seas, the Silk
Road, and the Grand Trunk Road, not through undersea fiber or via satellite links. Trade
depends on the legal environment in two crucial ways: first, the law must dismantle
protectionist legal barriers erected through history (this is the standard focus of teaching
and writing in international trade law); second, the law can facilitate cross-border trade
by erecting a legal infrastructure to reduce uncertainty in international transactions (this
is the standard focus of teaching and writing on international business transactions).20 Let
us label both features of the legal environment, taken together, the “Trade Plus” regime.
Both aspects of the Trade Plus regime need to be reevaluated in light of the
burgeoning trade in services delivered through the ether.
Four recent controversies in cyber-trade help make plain the legal issues at stake
in net-work trade. We consider here the following disputes: (1) the supply of gambling
from Antigua to the United States; (2) the outsourcing of radiological services to India;
(3) Yahoo’s encounter with French laws barring Nazi memorabilia; and (4) an Alien
Torts Statute suit charging Yahoo with complicity in Chinese political repression.
These case studies are instructive as to possible differences between Trade 1.0
and Trade 2.0.21 The first conflict, over gambling from Antigua, reveals four points of
pressure: (1) services may be more likely than goods to implicate local cultural norms;
(2) “services . . . may be more footloose than relocated manufacturing activities because

20. In his classic study, Douglass North suggests that “[t]he major role of institutions in a
society is to reduce uncertainty.” DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 6 (1990).
21. For alternative characterizations of the differences between trade in goods and trade in
services, see MIROSLAV N. JOVANOVIC, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: LIMITS
AND PROSPECTS 410-11 (2005), which described technical and social differences between trade
in goods and trade in services, including the fact that women make up a higher percentage of the
European workforce in services than in manufacturing; Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Splintering and
Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations, 7 WORLD ECON. 133 (1984), which outlines
economic differences between trade in goods and trade in services; and Drusilla K. Brown, Alan
V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, Modelling Multilateral Trade Liberalization in Services (Univ.
of Mich. Sch. of Pub. Policy, Discussion Paper No. 378, 1995), available at
http://www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers376-400/r378.pdf, which identifies
differences such as “the movement of factors internationally to permit onsite production of
services, the perishability of services, the distinctive nature and size of transport costs in services,
the role of traditional comparative advantage in determining patterns of services trade, and the
embodiment and disembodiment of services into and out of goods.”
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of lower capital-intensity and sunk costs”; 22 (3) unlike goods, electronic services are
difficult to control at border checkpoints; and (4) consumers now personally engage in
direct cross-border trade in services more than they have in the past with respect to
goods. The second case study, of radiology from Bangalore, raises yet more concerns: (1)
outsourced services often involve the transfer of sensitive personal data; (2) the measure
of the quality of a service often involves not just the appraisal of the outcome, but also
the appraisal of the process by which the service was produced; 23 and (3) we lack
experience in identifying and restraining tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in services;
and (4) services employ white-collar professionals who have historically not faced
widespread international competition. Yahoo’s conflicts with foreign hate-speech codes
raise the question of whether a net-work provider need comply with the rules of all of the
jurisdictions in which it operates, and whether the home jurisdiction should assist foreign
jurisdictions in this task. Yahoo’s retreat from China shows how cross-border net-work
providers’ enormous role in disseminating information can leave them vulnerable to
demands to censor and surveil dissidents.
These characteristics raise pressing legal questions, some new to Trade 2.0 and
some familiar to Trade 1.0. For example: How can we protect consumer privacy amid a
worldwide dataflow among information processors? Can intellectual property be secured
as it traverses the globe? If the outsourced process fails, who will be liable? Will the
liberalization of trade in services require the dismantling of local certification and
licensing requirements in favor of distant or global norms? Will the consumers of network have to rely entirely on whatever legal protections they might find across the globe
in the home jurisdiction of net-work providers? More directly put, will Americans be left
to the mercy of Antiguan law?
A.

Gambling in Antigua (United States—Gambling)

There was a time when American adventurers booked passage to Havana to place
a bet. Recognizing that it might offer betting without the tribulations of a Caribbean
journey, Antigua set out a decade ago to “become the Las Vegas and Atlantic City of
Internet gambling.” 24 Quickly, this island of seven working stoplights became the
principal haven for computer servers offering gambling to Americans. 25 Other
jurisdictions followed suit soon after. Spurred by an American entrepreneur, a Mohawk
Indian community in Quebec set up computer servers on the banks of the St. Lawrence

22. UNITED NATIONS, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2004: THE SHIFT TOWARD SERVICES, at
xxv (2004).
23. Cf. Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Susanne K. Schmidt, Mutual Recognition “On Trial”: The
Long Road to Services Liberalization, 14 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 717, 719 (2007) (“[F]or services
almost all regulations have to do with processes . . . .”). For a typology of services by availability
of metric for measuring performance, see Ravi Aron & Jitendra V. Singh, Getting Offshoring
Right, HARV. BUS. REV., Dec. 2005, at 139.
24. Don Yaeger, Bucking the Odds, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 8, 2001, at R1.
25. Id. (“[A]n estimated 80% of all gaming URLs on the Web can be traced back to servers
on the 108-square-mile island.”).
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River—close to the American market and atop a “major fibre optic corridor.” 26 Its
principal client was online gambling provider PartyGaming, established by an American
lawyer and an Indian expatriate programmer and incorporated in the British overseas
territory of Gibraltar.27 PartyGaming grew into a multinational corporation listed on the
London Stock Exchange once valued at two billion dollars. 28 In 2005, almost ninety
percent of PartyGaming’s customers were in the United States, a country whose
authorities “maintained that such gambling is illegal.”29
But these moneymaking paradises would not remain undisturbed for long.
Relying upon a law enacted in 1961 to dismantle gambling operations run by organized
crime, American prosecutors issued arrest warrants for online gambling operators. ThenAttorney General Janet Reno warned: “‘You can’t go offshore and hide. You can’t go
online and hide . . . .’”30 One American expatriate entrepreneur, confident that because he
ran his business from Antigua, where online gambling was legal, “[n]o judge is going to
let [an arrest warrant against him] stand,” returned to the mainland to defend himself.31
Jay Cohen would spend a year and a half in prison, perhaps ruing his bad bet.32 For its
part, PartyGaming would lose billions of dollars in market value when the United States
enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act in 2006.33
Antigua responded to U.S. enforcement efforts like any country that found its
exports hampered by legal restrictions elsewhere: it filed a claim against the United
States before the WTO. Antigua’s claim, however, was novel: it was the first brought
under GATS,34 and the first to challenge barriers to trade via the Internet. Antigua argued
that the requirement of physical establishment in certain specified zones in the United
26. John Greenwood, Billion$ and Billion$ Served, FIN. POST BUS., Oct. 7, 2005, at 67.
27. Pratley, supra note 19.
28. Kurt Eichenwald, At PartyGaming, Everything’s Wild, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2005, § 3
(Sunday Business), at 1; Yahoo Finance, PartyGaming Stock Quote Summary,
http://uk.finance.yahoo
.com/q?s=PRTY.L (reporting market capitalization for PartyGaming as £971 million as of March
7, 2008). With the loss of the United States market after the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act (UIGEA) in September 2006, the stock collapsed. Yahoo Finance, PartyGaming
Share Price Chart, http://uk.finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=PRTY.L (last visited Apr. 19, 2009)
(showing precipitous drop in stock price upon passage of UIGEA).
29. Eichenwald, supra note 28.
30. Paul Blustein, Against All Odds, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2006, at D1.
31. See id.; Rebecca Leung, Any Given Sunday, CBS NEWS, Sept. 7, 2003,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/04/60minutes/main571621.shtml.
32. United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming conviction of Cohen
for violating Wire Act by facilitating sports betting over the Internet). Fearing that a similar fate
would befall her son should he return to the United States, the mother of Cohen’s business partner
did not tell her son of his father’s death. Life Online Means Being on the Lam, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Mar. 26, 2000, at 102.
33. See 31 U.S.C.A §§ 5361-5367 (Supp. 2007). Since the passage of the Act, PartyGaming
has sought to bar American users. PARTYGAMING, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2006). American
authorities also arrested a number of online gambling executives from the United Kingdom who
made the mistake of transiting through the United States. Carrie Johnson, Crashing the Party,
WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2007, at D1.
34. See infra note 113.
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States ran afoul of the national treatment obligation by disadvantaging foreign
providers. 35 Antigua further argued that the United States violated its commitment to
provide market access to trade in “other recreational services.” 36 The United States
protested that it never agreed to open up trade in gambling services, specifically
excluding “sporting” from its liberalization commitment. 37 Canvassing a number of
sources, the Appellate Body concluded that the United States had indeed committed to
open up gambling services.38 Controversy over whether a country committed to liberalize
a particular service might seem awkward; after all, should not the parties to the trade
agreement know what economic activities each side has agreed to liberalize? But because
it is often possible to characterize a particular service in multiple ways, some liberalized
and some not, this most basic of disputes (is there a liberalization commitment?) will
prove a consistent thorn in the side of net-work. More importantly, changes in tradability
make possible cross-border competition in services that nation-states may not have
anticipated when they committed to liberalization.
The United States argued that, even if it had committed to liberalize gambling, it
had met its obligations. After all, Antiguan corporations were welcome—like any
American national—to provide gambling to Americans, as long as they set up shop in
Las Vegas or another permissive American jurisdiction.39 The United States also insisted
that, because of their differing consumer experiences and regulatory risks, offline
gambling and online gambling were two distinct services, and thus opening up one and
not the other did not effectively deny national treatment. Moreover, the market access
requirement, the United States argued, did not bar a total prohibition on a particular
service.
Seized of the dispute, the WTO’s Appellate Body confined its analysis to the
market access complaint, finding it unnecessary to resolve the national treatment
complaint. The United States argued that its rules against online gambling were merely
rules regulating the form or manner in which services are delivered, not quantitative
constraints on services or suppliers.40 Under this reasoning, the United States would meet
35. See Appellate Body Report, Mexico—Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services,
WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Mexico—Telecommunications Services].
36. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 5, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter United
States—Gambling].
37. Id. ¶ 14.
38. Id. ¶ 373.
39. Executive Summary of the Second Written Submission of the United States, United
States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 26,
WT/DS285 (Jan. 16, 2004), available at http://www.antiguawto.com/wto/22_US_Exec_sum_2nd
_Written_Sub_16Jan04.pdf (“Antigua has not offered evidence of any restriction that would stop
its suppliers from supplying their services by the same non-remote means available to domestic
suppliers. Hence there is no national treatment violation.”).
40. Executive Summary of the Appellant Submission of the United States, United States—
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 21, WT/DS285
(Jan. 14, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_
Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/Dispute_Settlement_Listings/asset_upload_file656_5581
.pdf.

290

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34: 281

its market access commitment for a service even if it barred the provision of that service
online entirely. The Appellate Body, however, held that a blanket prohibition operated as
a “zero quota,” and thus presented a quantitative restraint prohibited by the market access
commitment.41
GATS, however, permits derogation where “necessary to protect public morals or
to maintain public order.” 42 This clause serves as a crucial regulatory safety valve,
ensuring that liberalizing commitments do not unintentionally jeopardize important local
public policies. The Appellate Body accepted the American contention that the restraints
on online gambling were necessary to protect concerns related to “(1) organized crime;
(2) money laundering; (3) fraud; (4) risks to youth, including underage gambling; and (5)
public health.”43 Gambling via the Internet posed special concerns: “(i) the volume, speed
and international reach of remote gambling transactions; (ii) the virtual anonymity of
such transactions; (iii) low barriers to entry in the context of the remote supply of
gambling and betting services; and the (iv) isolated and anonymous environment in
which such gambling takes place.” 44 The Appellate Body agreed that the “distinctive
characteristics of the remote supply of gambling services may call for distinctive
regulatory methods.” 45 But the United States stumbled on an inconsistency: U.S. law
“authorizes domestic service suppliers, but not foreign service suppliers, to offer remote
betting services in relation to certain horse races.”46 With the United States stubborn in its
resistance to resolving this inconsistency, the WTO granted Antigua the right to retaliate
by suspending Antigua’s TRIPS obligation to respect U.S. intellectual property rights in
an amount corresponding to the estimated lost revenues from online horse-racing. 47
Antigua can now truly become a Pirate of the Caribbean.

41. United States—Gambling, supra note 36, ¶¶ 251-52.
42. GATS, supra note 9, art. XIV(a) (making an exception for measures “necessary to protect
public morals or to maintain public order”); id. art. XIV(b) (making an exception for measures
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”).
43. United States—Gambling, supra note 36, ¶¶ 283, 323-27.
44. Id. ¶ 323 (internal quotations omitted).
45. Id. ¶ 347.
46. Id. ¶¶ 361, 364, 371.
47. Decision by the Arbitrator, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 4.118-4.119, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007); see also
Gary Rivlin, Gambling Dispute With a Tiny Country Puts U.S. in a Bind, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2007, at C1. Antigua sought a far greater amount as a sanction—equaling the lost revenues from
the entire online gambling sector, not just the small fraction of it devoted to horse racing. Indeed,
it remains unclear whether the United States could have complied with the WTO appellate body
decision by simply inviting Antiguan companies to supply online horserace gambling services. I
would argue that that would have been insufficient unless the United States could have shown
that online gambling with respect to horseracing was somehow far less prone to the
vulnerabilities allegedly afflicting other forms of online gambling.
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Boston Brahmins and Bangalore Doctors

In hospitals around the country, yesterday’s photographic film is giving way to
today’s digital imaging.48 Digitization of medical images facilitates review, reproduction,
archiving, and error checking, while enabling computer enhancement and speeding
retrieval.49 Digitization also permits radiology, once confined to review of films slapped
atop lit boards in medical offices, to be conducted from a computer in the home or across
the world—“anywhere with broadband access.” 50 Crucial to this possibility is the
standardization of communications and semantic protocols, which enable digital images
produced on one system to be accurately stored, communicated and interpreted across
different hardware platforms. 51 Indeed, manufacturers, professional societies and other
interested parties have developed the Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine
standard (DICOM) for radiological data. One radiologist who supplies his services to the
United States from Bangalore, reports: “You can’t reach over and slap [the radiologist]
on the back, but every other aspect of the interaction is preserved.”52
Hospitals now regularly outsource their nightshift radiology across the world “to
be read by doctors in the light of day.”53 New firms have sprung up, responding to a
“shortage of U.S. radiologists and an exploding demand for more sophisticated scans to
diagnose scores of ailments.”54 One firm established in Idaho in 2001, listed its stock on
Nasdaq in 2006 and now has a market capitalization of some eighty million dollars.55
This firm, NightHawk Radiology, sends images from United States hospitals to be read
by physicians, principally to Sydney. Another leading provider, Teleradiology Solutions,
transmits images from United States hospitals to be read by physicians principally in
Bangalore.

48. See James H. Thrall, Reinventing Radiology in the Digital Age: Part I. The All-Digital
Department, 236 RADIOLOGY 382 (2005).
49. Emma Wilkinson, X-ray Technology in the 21st Century, BBC NEWS, May 30, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6700847.stm.
50. James Brice, Globalization Comes to Radiology, DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING, Nov. 1, 2003, at
70.
51. See NIGHTHAWK RADIOLOGY HOLDINGS INC., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2006) (“The
advent of the Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine, or DICOM, standard for
transferring images and associated information, high-speed broadband internet connections,
digitization and picture archival and communication systems, or PACS, has contributed to
increased utilization of diagnostic imaging technologies by permitting radiologists to practice
remotely.”).
52. International Teleradiology, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 662, 662 (2006) (quoting Dr. Arjun
Kalyanpur of Teleradiology Solutions).
53. Dawn Fallik, The Doctor Is In—But Not in U.S., PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 12, 2004, at A1.
54. Lindsey Tanner, Associated Press, U.S. Doctors Turn to Outsourcing To Help Diagnose
Ills, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at A1, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
health/2002110413_outsource06.html.
55. Yahoo Finance, Nighthawk Radiations Holdings, Inc., http://finance.yahoo.com/
q?s=nhwk (last visited Apr. 16, 2009) (revealing a market capitalization of $81 million).
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But can a patient trust a doctor who lives in a different hemisphere? As one
reporter asks, “Will a radiologist on another continent be as easily held liable?”56 Can
private medical records be protected as they travel around the world? How can the patient
be assured that the foreign radiologist is adequately trained? The major providers of such
services have sought to allay some of these concerns. They hire only radiologists certified
by the American Board of Radiology and licensed to practice in the United States.57
It was precisely the absence of such qualifications that foiled the most
technologically sophisticated version of cross-border teleradiology, a service offered by
the Indian outsourcing giant Wipro. Wipro brought its considerable computing talents to
the project, going far beyond the simple transmission of images and the return
transmission of a report. That service, tested in collaboration with Massachusetts General
Hospital, permitted Wipro’s Bangalore radiologists not just access to the images of the
patient taken that day or night,58 but the ability to “download prior studies, reports, and
patient history with as much ease as if they were working in an MGH reading room in
Boston.”59 But Wipro failed to attract U.S.-licensed radiologists to Bangalore, and thus its
radiologists were not certified to read patient images. Furthermore, Medicare and certain
state Medicaid programs only reimburse radiology interpretation services performed
within the United States. Wipro thus restricted its experiment to collaboration between
Indian and U.S. radiologists where the U.S. radiologist would perform the final
interpretation.60 But even this collaboration drew public furor, and Wipro retreated.61
Neither restricting the supply of radiological services to U.S.-licensed providers,
nor requiring review by U.S.-based radiologists resolves all concerns about fraud,
privacy, and the quality of care.62 Both the Nighthawk Radiology and the Wipro models
need a legal framework that simultaneously avoids “Buy American” government
procurement constraints, protects privacy across borders, and puts doctors and companies
on the hook for malpractice even to patients in other hemispheres—in other words, a
legal framework that both liberalizes trade and protects consumers.

56. Rob Stein, Hospital Services Performed Overseas: Training, Licensing Questioned,
WASH. POST., Apr. 24, 2005, at A1.
57. See, e.g., Teleradiology Solutions, Legal/Licensing, http://www.telradsol.com/legal.html
(last visited Apr. 18, 2009) (indicating “[A]ll interpreting staff for US hospitals are ABR-certified
radiologists”); Nighthawk Radiology Services, http://www.nighthawkrad.net (last visited Apr. 18,
2009) (repeatedly stating that its staff consists of “U.S. board-certified, state-licensed, and
hospital-privileged physicians”).
58. The norm in teleradiology is that the teleradiologist lacks prior patient data. Robert
Steinbrook, The Age of Teleradiology, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 5, 7 (2007) (“A teleradiologist will
often have no information about the patient beyond that contained in the study requisition.”).
59. Brice, supra note 50.
60. Andrew Pollack, Who’s Reading Your X-Ray?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2003, § 3 (Sunday
Business), at 1.
61. See Stein, supra note 56.
62. In Part III, I suggest that we might borrow from European approaches to privacy
protection and introduce cyber-tribunals to resolve any disputes that may arise.
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Yahoo in France (LICRA v. Yahoo)

Companies like Yahoo and Google provide platforms for people to communicate,
whether for discussing politics or sports, selling goods or services, or, on occasion,
facilitating crime. The fact that both of these companies are based in the United States,
where freedom of speech is especially broad, has sometimes caused them to test—and
cross—the limits of speech in other jurisdictions, which might more broadly proscribe
certain speech categories. The next two cases I describe—Yahoo in France and Yahoo in
China—help demonstrate the conflicts of law that can arise in net-work.
Yahoo’s encounter with French laws barring Nazi paraphernalia produced
perhaps the most elaborate judicial consideration to date of the potential conflicts of law
arising from net-work. Yahoo’s efforts to provide information services to France from the
United States produced a clash of two legal cultures—one cherishing free speech and the
other protecting against racist and anti-Semitic speech. The conflict drew a sharp
response from both sides of the Atlantic. The French judge in the case declared Yahoo
“the largest vehicle in existence for the promotion [of] Nazism.” 63 Yahoo’s lawyer
decried what he perceived to be the “French imperialism” implicit in a Parisian court
order against Yahoo’s California-based enterprise, 64 and some federal judges in the
United States would declare efforts to enforce that order as unwarranted extraterritorial
intrusions of French law into the United States.65
Yahoo, of course, operates from a country with broad constitutional protections
against state infringement of speech. The terrifying histories of other lands, however,
have led them to bar certain types of speech. 66 Like many countries across Europe,
French laws bar speech invoking or glorifying Nazism.67 More specifically, the French

63. This is Judge Ferguson’s translation of “la plus grande entreprise de banalisation du
nazisme qui soit” in Judge Gomez’s May 22, 2000 order. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le
Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1227 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., concurring)
(quoting Union des Etudiants Juifs de France & Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisémitisme v.
Yahoo! Inc. & Yahoo France, Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 2000 (Fr.) [hereinafter LICRA-May], available at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis
20000522.htm, available in English at http://www.lapres.net/yahen.html).
64. Before the French court, Yahoo’s lawyer declared that any attempt of the French court to
regulate the American enterprise’s U.S.-based .com website would amount to “French
imperialism.” Greg Wrenn, Yahoo! v. Licra, COMM. LAW., Fall 2006, 5, 6 (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/
forums/communication/CommLawyv24_3.pdf.
65. See Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1234-35 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
66. “The display . . . of NAZI objects . . . constitutes an offense to the collective memory of
the country profoundly damaged by the atrocities committed by and in the name of the Nazi
criminal enterprise against French citizens and above all against citizens of the Jewish faith.”
LICRA-May, supra note 63.
67. German laws criminalize insults against members of groups persecuted by Nazis or other
totalitarian systems. ERIC M. BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 180 (2005).
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Penal Code “declares it a crime to exhibit or display Nazi emblems.”68 Yahoo provides a
number of services that potentially run afoul of this law: its search engine services allow
people to locate the websites of Holocaust deniers; its Geocities webpage service allowed
someone to post Mein Kampf and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion; and its auction
services, which match buyers and sellers around the world, permit the traffic of material
glorifying Nazism. In April 2000, the International League Against Racism and AntiSemitism (LICRA) filed a complaint in a Parisian court seeking to enjoin Yahoo from
hosting auctions featuring Nazi material.
In May 2000, Judge Gomez of the Paris Tribunal de grande instance offered his
first interim ruling, ordering Yahoo to “take all measures to dissuade and make
impossible any access by a surfer calling from France” through Yahoo.com to the
disputed sites and services.69 Yahoo insisted that this was technically impossible because
the nature of the Internet left it unable to deny access to French citizens without
simultaneously denying access to Americans. Yahoo sought, undoubtedly, to place itself
within an earlier precedent, a case in which a French Superior Court judge had ruled that
“since it was technically impossible to block or filter foreign-based Internet sites, the nine
ISPs could not be held criminally or civilly liable for objectionable United States-based
content accessed by French citizens.” 70 Responding to Yahoo’s claim of technical
incapacity, Judge Gomez appointed an international expert panel to determine whether
Yahoo could identify French web users in order to deny them certain content. The panel
concluded that technological means known as “geolocation” allowed “over 70% of the IP
addresses of surfers residing in French territory [to] be identified as being French,” and
two of the three panelists suggested that asking surfers to declare their nationality would
raise the success rate of identifying French residents to approximately 90%,71 (though
this latter opinion seems more appropriate for sociologists than computer experts to
make).
This was sufficient for Judge Gomez, who ruled that “effective filtering methods”
were available to Yahoo.72 Note that Judge Gomez did not rule that French law required
Yahoo to desist from making Nazi material available to French persons regardless of the
effect on United States users. He first established (at least to his own satisfaction) that
Yahoo could specifically deny French residents access to the material without removing
it more generally. Of course, Judge Gomez believed that a “moral imperative” should

68. Yahoo! Inc., 433 F.3d at 1219.
69. Id. (citing LICRA-May, supra note 63).
70. Lyombe Eko, New Medium, Old Free Speech Regimes: The Historical and Ideological
Foundations of French & American Regulation of Bias-Motivated Speech and Symbolic
Expression on the Internet, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 69, 72 (2006).
71. Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme & Union des Etudiants Juifs de France v.
Yahoo! Inc. & Yahoo France, Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original
jurisdiction] Paris, Nov. 20, 2000 (Fr.) [hereinafter LICRA-November], available at
http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20001120.pdf,
available
in
English
at
http://www.eff.org/legal/Jurisdiction_and_sovereignty/LICRA_v_Yahoo/20001120_fr_int_ruling
.en.pdf.
72. Id.
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motivate Yahoo to remove this material universally, but he did not order this.73 Rather,
his order was carefully drawn to deny access only to those within France. Judge Gomez’s
approach thus reflects the international law principle of comity—here, specifically,
respect for the wide ambit given to speech within the United States. As we will see in
Subsection III.B.1, the practicalities of the order might well compromise speech in the
United States, but the court took some pains to satisfy itself that this was not the likely
result.
Not only did Yahoo face an injunction and a penalty of, at first, €100,000 (later
reduced to 100,000 francs) per day, but both the company and its American CEO also
faced criminal charges. In 2001, prosecutors, acting on a complaint by groups concerned
about racism and anti-Semitism, 74 brought charges against Yahoo and its CEO Tim
Koogle for “justifying a crime against humanity” and “exhibiting a uniform, insignia or
emblem of a person guilty of crimes against humanity,”75 crimes punishable by up to five
years in jail for Koogle and fines of €45,735.76 The charges arose from the same facts
underlying the earlier civil action. In 2003, in the criminal case, the Court held that it had
jurisdiction in this criminal case, but acquitted the defendants based on a lack of evidence
that the defendants had praised Nazi atrocities.77 Koogle’s acquittal was upheld on appeal
in 2005 on the ground that “the simple act of hosting auctions of Nazi memorabilia from
a Web site based in the United States did not meet the tight standards French courts have
previously used when ruling in Holocaust negation cases.”78
After losing in the Parisian civil case, Yahoo retreated to its home jurisdiction,
where it sought protection by way of a declaratory judgment that the French orders were
unenforceable in the United States. Yahoo had, in the interim, slightly modified its
policies (not in response to the French ruling but sua sponte, Yahoo insisted) to bar the
sale of items promoting hate, but the policies made an exception for books and films and
did not affect Yahoo’s search engine services, which still allowed users to search for
Holocaust denier material.79 Yahoo said that its noncompliance with the French orders
73. Id. (“[A]n initiative [to ban Nazi materials on Yahoo websites] would . . . have the merit
of satisfying an ethical and moral imperative shared by all democratic societies . . . .”).
74. Yahoo Facing French Criminal Charges for Web Sites that Auction Nazi Memorabilia, 7
Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 221 (Mar. 6, 2002).
75. Yahoo Boss Cleared over Nazi Sales, BBC NEWS, Feb. 11, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/europe/2750573.stm (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. French Court Ruling Ends Long-Term Saga over Nazi Memorabilia Auctions on Yahoo!,
8 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 176 (Feb. 19, 2003).
77. Amicale des Déportés d’Auschwitz et des Camps de Haute Silésie, Mrap v. Timothy
Koogle, Yahoo Inc., Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction]
Paris, Feb. 11, 2003 (Fr.), available at http://www.legalis.net/cgi-iddn/french/affichejnet.cgi?droite=
decisions/responsabilite/jug_tgi-paris_110203.htm; see also Ex-Yahoo Chief Acquitted over Nazi
Sites, CNN.COM, Feb. 11, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/biztech/02/11/france.yahoo.reut.
78. Lawrence J. Speer, French Court Exonerates Yahoo! Site, and Ex-CEO, in Auctions of
Nazi Memorabilia, 10 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 384 (Apr. 13, 2005).
79. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 14-15, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et
l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (No. 01-17424).
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subjected it to the “Damocles sword” of the enforcement of penalties for this failure.80
Finding a genuine case or controversy, District Judge Fogel ruled on the merits that the
French orders were unenforceable by a United States court because they violated public
policy embedded in the First Amendment. 81 LICRA appealed, and a divided Ninth
Circuit panel dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the French
defendants.82
Emphasizing the critical issues at stake, the Ninth Circuit reheard the case en
banc. In a set of six heavily divided opinions, the court dismissed the case, but did so
without a rationale that drew majority support. Three judges voted to dismiss for lack of
ripeness, and three others voted to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a sufficient
majority on an eleven person en banc panel to dismiss the case.83 The dissenting judges
would have reached the merits. Judge Fisher, writing for himself and four other judges,
would have held that the French order imposed a prior restraint on Yahoo and did so in
an overly vague and broad manner—and thus was repugnant under the First
Amendment.84 However, Judge Fletcher, writing for himself and two other judges, was
not so certain. He distinguished between two forms in which the First Amendment
repugnancy claim could arise: (1) the French court might require Yahoo to take
additional steps that did not restrict access to users in the United States; or (2) the French
court might require Yahoo to take additional steps that had the necessary consequence of
restricting access by users in the United States. 85 In suggesting that “the answers are
likely to be different” to the questions of whether each of the two forms is
constitutional, 86 Judge Fletcher seemed to suggest that the first form might not be
repugnant under the First Amendment, while the second form might well be. Yahoo, for
its part, would have declared even the first fact scenario to present an unconstitutional
intrusion, asking rhetorically “whether foreign nations can enlist our citizens and courts
as reluctant policemen to insure that their own citizens are not exposed to ideas the
foreign governments consider offensive.”87 Judge Fisher agreed, and would have declared
the order constitutionally repugnant because it required Yahoo “to guess what has to be
censored on its Internet services here in the United States . . . even if limited to Francebased users.”88
These problems are not unique to Yahoo or to France. Google faced a similar
difficulty in Brazil, where its social networking service Orkut was being used in part for
child pornography, incitements to commit crime, neo-Nazism, cruelty to animals, racism,
80. 433 F.3d at 1218; Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 79, at 50, 52.
81. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1194 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
82. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.
2004).
83. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir.
2006) (en banc).
84. Id. at 1234 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 1217-18 (majority opinion).
86. Id. at 1218.
87. Appellee’s Answering Brief at 2, 433 F.3d 1199 (No. 01-17424).
88. 433 F.3d at 1235-36 (Fisher, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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religious intolerance, homophobia, and xenophobia. 89 Brazilian law declares such
activities illegal. When the Brazilian prosecutors sought Google’s Brazilian subsidiary’s
assistance in identifying the participants in Orkut groups devoted to such banned
activities, that subsidiary professed a lack of control over the information demanded. The
information, the subsidiary reported, resided on the parent company’s servers in the
United States. Unhappy with this answer, a Brazilian judge reproached Google for
evincing a “profound disrespect for national sovereignty.” 90 Brazilian authorities
readdressed the subpoena to Google’s Silicon Valley headquarters, and Google promptly
complied.91
Google reportedly maintains a “policy of keeping data in the US to protect it from
disclosure to foreign governments.” 92 Call this the Safe Server Strategy—locating a
server in a jurisdiction where constitutional guarantees of human rights will prevent that
jurisdiction’s courts from enforcing an order supporting state suppression of information.
Google might well have developed that strategy based on Yahoo’s experience in France.
One might speculate that Google complied with the Brazilian subpoena because it had
learned from Yahoo’s experience that it was better not to resist hate speech regulations in
democratic countries, at least where they did not require compromising the service
worldwide.93
D.

Yahoo in China (Wang v. Yahoo)

In August 2007, Yu Ling filed suit under the Alien Torts Statute and the Torture
Victims Protection Act, alleging that Yahoo and its subsidiaries had violated international
law by helping the Chinese government uncover the identity of her husband, Wang
Xiaoning, a political dissident. Using a Yahoo email account and a Yahoo Group, Wang
Xiaoning had distributed political writings anonymously from his home in Beijing for
years. When the authorities discovered Wang’s identity, they detained and, according to
the lawsuit, tortured him. According to the suit, the authorities beat and kicked him,
forcing him to confess to engaging in “anti-state” activities. 94 The Beijing Higher
People’s Court held him guilty of sedition; it reported, “Wang had edited, published and
contributed articles to 42 issues of two political e-journals, advocating for open elections,
89. Ação Civil Pública com Pedido de Antecipação de Tutela [Public Civil Action with
Request for Protective Order] at 16, T.J.S.P.-17, Ap. Civ. No. 2006.61.00.018332-8, filed
22.8.2006 (Brazil), available at
http://www.prsp.mpf.gov.br/cidadania/dhumInt/ACP%20Google%20Brasil.pdf.
90. Andrew Downie, Google and the Pedophiles, TIME, Sept. 6, 2006, http://www.time.com/
time/nation/article/0,8599,1531986,00.html.
91. Id.
92. Richard Waters, Brazil Lawyers Lean on Google, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2006, at 23. But
see infra note 252 and accompanying text (noting Google’s approach to China).
93. Some suggest that U.S. courts might be more inclined to grant comity with respect to
rulings from liberal foreign regimes. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States:
Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992).
94. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Yahoo Sued over Data on Chinese Dissidents, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
19, 2007, at C1.
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a multi-party system and separation of powers in the government.”95 Wang now sits in
Beijing Prison No. 2, serving a ten-year sentence for “‘incitement to subvert state
power.’”96 “Yahoo betrayed my husband,” Yu says, arguing that Yahoo facilitated her
husband’s arrest and conviction.97 The Chinese court’s opinion reveals at least some level
of involvement by Yahoo in the case. A human rights group noted that the evidence
against Wang “included information provided by Yahoo Holdings (Hong Kong) Ltd.
stating that Wang’s ‘aaabbbccc’ Yahoo! Group was set up through the mainland Chinabased
email
address
bxoguh
98
@yahoo.com.cn.”
Yahoo argues that its Chinese operations must comply with lawful official
requests for information, and that it does not know how that information will be used:
“‘Yahoo China will not know whether the demand for information is for a legitimate
criminal investigation or is going to be used to prosecute political dissidents.’”99
Yahoo’s foray into China raises a central issue for net-work: how can a company
supplying services around the globe comport with the laws of repressive regimes without
fouling human rights? The issue is especially salient for net-work providers as they traffic
in information—precisely the target of repressive regimes. Human Rights Watch
identifies a “race to the bottom” where Western corporations seek to outdo each other in
assisting Chinese political repression.100 Yahoo has, for the moment, chosen to withdraw,
at least behind a minority shareholding, transferring its Chinese assets to mainland
corporation Alibaba in return for an ownership stake.101 Yahoo insists that the onus must
be on the U.S. government to put pressure on the Chinese government to free Wang and
other dissidents.102 At the end of 2007, Yahoo settled with the dissident families.103

95. Luke O’Brien, Yahoo Betrayed My Husband, WIRED, Mar. 15, 2007,
http://www.wired.com/politics/onlinerights/news/2007/03/72972 (quoting the court’s written
ruling).
96. Ariana Eunjung Cha & Sam Diaz, Advocates Sue Yahoo in Chinese Torture Cases,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, at D1; see also Victoria Kwan, Prisoner Profile: Wang Xiaoning,
CHINA RTS. F., Oct. 2006, at 126, available at http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/CRF.3.2006/CRF2006-3_Wang
Xiaoning.pdf.
97. O’Brien, supra note 95.
98. Kwan, supra note 96; see also O’Brien, supra note 95.
99. Miguel Helft, Chinese Political Prisoner Sues in U.S. Court, Saying Yahoo Helped
Identify Dissidents, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at C4 (quoting Yahoo spokesman Jim Cullinan).
100. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “RACE TO THE BOTTOM”: CORPORATE COMPLICITY IN
CHINESE INTERNET CENSORSHIP (2006), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/china0806webwcover.pdf.
101. Keith Regan, Yahoo Investing $1 Billion in Chinese Internet Company, E-COM. TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2005, http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/45411.html.
102. See Chmielewski, supra note 94; Verne Kopytoff, Yahoo Pleads for Chinese Dissidents,
S.F. CHRON., Feb. 22, 2008, at C1.
103. Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles with Chinese Families, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2007, at
D4.
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FREEING TRADE, WHILE PROTECTING LAW

At the core of each of the cyber-trade controversies described above is a service
provider supplying a service to consumers in a foreign jurisdiction where there may be a
conflict of laws between the home jurisdiction of the service provider and the home
jurisdiction of the consumer. In each case also, the service provider, lacking legal
precedents or authoritative guidance, must innovate not only technological methods and
business models, but also legal structures. Three distinctive legal challenges of Trade 2.0
become apparent: (1) the lack of adequate legal infrastructure, as compared to trade in
traditional goods, necessary to liberalize trade; (2) the threat to law itself posed by the
footloose nature of net-work and the uncertainty of whose law should govern net-work
transactions—that of the exporting nation or that of the importing nation; and (3) the
danger that local control of net-work might lead to either Balkanization—the
disintegration of the World Wide Web into local arenas—or Stalinization—the repression
of political dissidents, identified through their online activity by compliant net-work
service providers.
In this Part, I develop a set of framework principles simultaneously to liberalize
and to regulate Trade 2.0. These principles help ameliorate the difficulties identified
above. To liberalize trade (the first challenge), I introduce two principles: technological
neutrality and dematerialization. Technological neutrality would require that online
versions of a service be tested under the same legal regime as the offline version of that
service. Dematerialization would require governments and services-standards bodies to
replace physical in-person requirements with online substitutes wherever possible. To
respond to the risk to law of footloose net-work trade (the second challenge), I argue for
glocalization—abiding by the local law of the jurisdiction in which a service is
consumed, where that law does not conflict with international law. But the assertion of
local law invites the unwelcome consequences of Balkanization and Stalinization. To
respond to the problem of Balkanization, I argue that countries will need to reinvigorate
efforts to harmonize laws. To respond to the problem of Stalinization, I argue that
companies themselves must adopt policies to “do no evil” and comport with human rights
law.
The principles I offer remain in a productive tension with one another. Consider
three tensions. First, the trade liberalization envisioned by both net-work parity and
dematerialization stands in contrast to glocalization, which poses legal hurdles to network trade. Yet, I suggest that abiding by the demands of local law will often staunch a
protectionist backlash against foreign service providers; the disclosure of the abuse of
information by foreign service providers with no legal recourse available to local citizens
could justify strong import restraints. It is the dictates of democracy, however, and not
these tactical benefits, that compel glocalization. Second, glocalization, in one sense, is
the antithesis of harmonization, with local regulation leading to the Balkanization of the
Internet, causing some to experience the dreaded “This material is not available in your
country” warning. Yet neither glocalization nor harmonization represents the mere
automatic capitulation to a foreign law entailed by the country of origin principle. Third,
a deregulated cyberspace (or one functioning under a country of origin rule) might be
ideal for dissidents within repressive regimes, who would now be able to access this
information space without fear of being turned over to the authorities. Thus, the respect
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for local law entailed by glocalization might run counter to the “do no evil” principle I
describe; however, because glocalization turns on popular sovereignty and is limited by
international law, including human rights law, it cannot justify comporting with demands
for political repression.
I first discuss below legal reform projects to accommodate Trade 2.0—how we
can free trade. I then turn to the steps we can take to ameliorate the threat to domestic
regulation posed by Trade 2.0—how we can protect law.
A.

Freeing Trade

Unlike trade in goods, the regulation of services occurs not at customs houses on
dry docks at border ports, but rather in administrative offices scattered inland. It consists,
for example, in certification and licensing rules, rules about government procurement,
geographical and quantitative restrictions, and rules for membership in private
associations.104 International trade law has long recognized that internal regulations, not
just border rules, might serve as barriers to trade in goods,105 but the even more extensive
diffusion of regulatory authority over services heightens the challenge for discerning
protectionist from other regulatory objects in services. Dispersing regulatory authority
through city and county halls, the chambers of self-regulatory associations, and state and
federal administrative and legislative units renders the task of liberalizing trade in
services particularly difficult.
The infancy of such efforts poses yet another challenge. Where liberalization of
trade in goods has a long, rich history, the global effort to dismantle barriers to trade in
services is barely a decade old. GATS introduced services to the binding agenda of global
trade liberalization in 1995. GATS, however, is far less demanding than its older cousin,
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was born from the ashes of
a world war. Where GATT requires national treatment for suppliers of goods unless an
exception has been carved out, GATS requires only the inverse: it permits discrimination
against foreign service providers, except in those few sectors specifically designated by a
state party for liberalization.106 Increasingly, regional trade arrangements offer stronger
liberalization mandates. Europe’s ambition to create a Single European Market remains
the leading effort to dismantle barriers to trade in services between countries (I discuss
aspects of the EU’s free trade regime for services in Subsection III.B.1 below). Free trade
in services is also one of the pillars of NAFTA107 and CAFTA-DR,108 as well as a goal of
104. Cf. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Barriers to Trade in Services in South
Eastern European (SEE) Countries—How Much Do They Matter?, at 5, OECD Doc.
CCNM/TD/SEE(2003)4/FINAL (Oct. 29, 2003) (identifying nontariff barriers often imposed on
services as including “quantitative restrictions, price based instruments, licensing or certification
requirements, discriminatory access to distribution, and communication systems”).
105. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III.1, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (“contracting parties recognize that internal . . . regulations . . . should not be
applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production”).
106. GATS, supra note 9, art. XVI (market access obligations for scheduled services only); id.
art. XVII(1) (national treatment obligation for scheduled services only).
107. NAFTA, supra note 11.
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regional arrangements from ASEAN 109 to the African Economic Community 110 to
Mercosur.111 All of the bilateral Free Trade Agreements ratified recently by the United
States—with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Morocco, Oman, and Singapore—include broad
obligations to liberalize services. Unlike GATS, these bilateral agreements adopt a
positive list approach to the sectoral commitments to liberalize trade in services,
assuming that all services are covered except those that are specifically excluded.112 Their
reach accordingly will likely prove especially broad.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the first WTO dispute squarely involving services,
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (United
108. CAFTA-DR, supra note 12. The Free Trade Area of the Americas Agreement would
envision a hemispheric free trade zone in goods and services. Free Trade Area of the Americas
Third Draft Agreement ch. XIII, arts. 3.1, 3.2, ch. XIV, arts. 2.1, 2.4, ch. XVI, arts. 2.1, 2.2, 3.13.3, Nov. 21, 2003, available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index_e.asp.
109. See Asean, supra note 14; text accompanying note 14.
110. Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community art. 4(2)(i), June 3, 1991, 30
I.L.M. 1241 (setting out the objective of “[t]he gradual removal, among Member States, of
obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital”).
111. Gabriel Gari, Free Circulation of Services in Mercosur: A Pending Task, 10 LAW & BUS.
REV. AM. 545, 553-57 (2004) (describing the Montevideo Protocol’s approach, yet to be broadly
implemented, to liberalization in services).
112. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Sultanate of Oman on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Oman,
arts. 2.1-2.3(2), 3.2(1), 4.1, 9.1(1)-(4), 11.1, Jan. 19, 2006, 120 Stat. 1191, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Oman_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html;
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, arts. 2.1-2.2, 2.3(2), 3.3, 7.2, 9.1(1)(6), 9.2(1)-(2), 9.2(6), 10.8, 11.1, 16.1(11), Apr. 12, 2005, 121 Stat. 1455, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.html;
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Bahr., arts. 1.3, 2.1-2.2,
3.2(1), 7.1, 9.1(1)-(3), 10.1, 12.1, 17.6, Sept. 14, 2004, 119 Stat. 3581, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final_texts/Section_Index.html;
United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, arts. 2.1-2.2, 7.1, 9.1, 10.3-10.4,
10.7, 10.12, 11.1, 11.6, 20.2, June 15, 2004, 118 Stat. 1103, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/FInal_Text/Section_Index.html;
United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., arts. 2.1-2.2, 8.1, 10.1, 17.9(1)-(3),
21.2, May 18, 2004, 118 Stat. 919, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html;
United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, arts. 3.1-3.2, 3.20(1), 7.1, 9.1(1)-(2),
11.1, 11.6, July 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 909, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Section_Index.html; United StatesSingapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., arts. 8.2, 8.7, 9.1(1)-(2), 11.2, 13.2 (1)-(3), May 6,
2003, 117 Stat. 948, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_Index.ht
ml. The agreements currently being negotiated or awaiting ratification do the same. See, e.g.,
United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., arts. 2.1-2.2, 3.3(1), 7.2,
9.1(1)-(5), 10.8, 11.1-11.3, 11.6, 12.2-12.3, 12.9, 16.1(8)-(10), 16.13, 19.6, May 8, 2006 (draft),
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/Draft_Text/Section_Index.html
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States—Gambling), centered on the Internet.113 I show below that this decision lays the
groundwork for extensive liberalization of net-work trade. I then elaborate some reforms
to the legal infrastructure to accommodate net-work.
1.

Technological Neutrality

Net-work providers share an Achilles’s Heel: because their services are not
delivered face-to-face, the authentication clues available through in-person presentation
are unavailable. Their remote nature thus leads to concern about fraud by suppliers (either
in representing their credentials or in failing to perform the service as promised) or
potential anonymity among consumers (leading to concerns about underage or otherwise
inappropriate consumption). Can a state simply assert these concerns to protect its local
suppliers, who after all can provide services face-to-face with greater ease than foreign
suppliers? If so, this would mark the death knell of cross-border net-work.
At first glance, United States—Gambling poses exactly this roadblock to network. After all, the Appellate Body held that the risks particular to electronically
mediated services might justify ignoring a country’s free trade commitments (so long,
that is, as the country bars all electronically mediated services, not just those provided by
foreigners).114 The WTO upheld a state’s banning of online suppliers (both domestic and
foreign) because of the risks of underage and pathological gambling, fraud, and money
laundering.
But even in largely dismissing Antiguan claims for access to the U.S. market, the
decision laid the groundwork for a substantial erosion of barriers to net-work. The
chapeau to GATS Article XIV permits a public order-based violation of trade
commitments only if it is not in fact a “disguised restriction” on trade in services.115 A
country may not maintain an infringing trade barrier if a “reasonably available
alternative” exists—one that “preserve[s] for the responding Member its right to achieve
its desired level of protection with respect to” its public order or public morality
113. Earlier cases, such as Canada—Periodicals, EC—Bananas, and Canada—Automobile
Industry, had raised GATS issues, but as supplements to GATT claims related to goods. See
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, supra note 1;
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
WT/DS139/AB/R (May 31, 2000); Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997); Mitsuo
Matsushita, Appellate Body Jurisprudence on the GATS and TRIPS Agreements, in THE WTO
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM, 1995-2003, at 455 (Federico Ortino & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
eds., 2004). A United States claim against Mexico considered services more directly, but required
the interpretation of a special telecommunications side-agreement, rather than basic GATS
obligations. Mexico—Telecommunications Services, supra note 35.
114. The Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that concerns underlying the U.S. statutes
barring remote gambling fell within the scope of “public morals” and/or “public order.” See
United States—Gambling, supra note 36, ¶ 373(D)(iii); supra notes 43-47 and accompanying
text.
115. GATS, supra note 9, art. XIV (requiring that “measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where like conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services”).
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objectives.116 But Antigua did not show that Antiguan gambling operators could alleviate
the American concerns through technical or other means. Rather, Antigua simply relied
on America’s stubborn refusal to discuss alternative means to achieving its regulatory
goals. Antigua might have instead demonstrated practical alternatives to the American
prohibition to achieve the desired regulatory goals. Antigua could have shown that it had
redoubled its financial crime efforts, strictly enforcing international anti-money
laundering principles, such as the international standards offered by the Financial Action
Task Force.117 Antigua could have required independent auditors from large international
firms to audit compliance by Antiguan gambling operations, helping assure users that the
computer systems and financial payouts were sound.118 Antigua could have shown that
the steps it requires to add money to a gambling account (such as bank wire transfers)
would prove nearly insurmountable for youth. And it could have required that gambling
providers make available services for gambling addicts, including mechanisms for
allowing people to limit losses or to lock themselves out.119
Perhaps the strongest rebuttal to the American argument in United States—
Gambling comes from the Supreme Court of the United States. The dormant Commerce
Clause creates a free trade area within the United States. In the recent case of Granholm
v. Heald, the Supreme Court considered a dormant Commerce Clause-based challenge to
Michigan and New York regulations barring out of state wineries from selling directly to
Michigan and New York residents.120 While Granholm involved trade in goods, not trade
in net-work services, both involve trade mediated largely by the Internet. In Granholm, as
in United States—Gambling, the defenders of trading restraints argued that they were
necessary to preserve local values. New York insisted that its rules were “essential” to
promoting no less a value than “temperance,” as well as the more mundane goal of
“collecting taxes.” 121 Requiring alcohol to pass through state sanctioned distribution
channels, New York argued, allows it “to effectively monitor alcohol distribution and
enforce its liquor laws.”122
The Supreme Court was not persuaded. New York and Michigan “provide[d] little
evidence for their claim that purchasing wine over the Internet by minors is a
problem.”123 The states could have “minimize[d] any risk with less restrictive steps . . .
[such as] requir[ing] an adult signature on delivery.”124 The Court held that New York’s
116. United States—Gambling, supra note 36, ¶ 308.
117. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, HANDBOOK FOR COUNTRIES AND ASSESSORS (2007),
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/5/59/38893482.pdf.
118. In the GATT context, the WTO has examined whether a trade restrictive measure was
necessary to protect against fraud. See Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶¶ 177-80, WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000).
119. Party Poker: Responsible Gaming, http://www.partypoker.com/responsible_gaming/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2009) (offering self-imposed deposit limits and “the self-exclusion tool,” which
gives the customer the ability to bar him or herself from the website for specified period).
120. 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
121. Brief for State of New York Respondents at 11, Swedenburg v. Kelly, 543 U.S. 954
(2004) (No. 03-1274).
122. Id.
123. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 490.
124. Id. at 490-91.
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“regulatory objectives [could] be achieved without discriminating against interstate
commerce, e.g., by requiring a permit as a condition of direct shipping.”125 The states’
“other rationales, such as facilitating orderly market conditions, protecting public health
and safety, and ensuring regulatory accountability . . . [could] also be achieved through
the alternative of an evenhanded licensing requirement.”126 The fundamental question,
the Court asked, is whether a State’s discriminatory regime “advance[d] a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives.” 127 The Supreme Court’s “reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives”
formulation comes strikingly close to the WTO’s “reasonably available alternative”;128
both give the tribunal the ability to strike regulations that unnecessarily restrain
competition from outside producers. The similarity in the Supreme Court and WTO
formulations is not a coincidence: though poles apart in their history and status, both
institutions promote commerce among jurisdictions while protecting the power of those
jurisdictions to regulate themselves.
Of course, even the most robust alternative for achieving the regulatory objectives
may not prevent all potential wrongdoing. But neither would a flat prohibition of online
gambling accomplish perfectly the regulatory goals. After all, underage persons can
sneak their way into casinos; gambling addiction predated the Internet; cash in casinos
can be more anonymous than an offshore bank account, which requires extensive security
measures; and organized crime is not entirely unknown in American gambling history.
The question is whether the proposed alternative achieves the “desired level of
protection,”129 not whether it promises one hundred percent compliance. In the U.S.—
Shrimp dispute, the WTO Appellate Body held that an importing nation’s insistence on a
“single, rigid, and unbending requirement” would constitute “arbitrary discrimination”
within the meaning of the GATT Article XX chapeau.130 Contrast District Judge Marilyn
Hall Patel’s standard for Napster, where she required the online service to remove one
hundred percent of copyright infringing material, a standard that Napster rightly insisted
was impossible to satisfy and that was not met even by offline distribution systems.131
The appropriate standard should be one where the online service should be required to
achieve the regulatory goals at rates roughly equivalent to those achieved by offline
versions of the service. This is a principle of technological neutrality.
Such steps would likely raise the costs of doing business electronically as well as
the costs for governments of enforcing compliance. Quite often, perhaps, the costs today
may be so high as to make net-work economically infeasible. Perhaps governments might
be willing to reduce compliance rates in some cases in view of the liberating and
economizing possibilities of the electronic medium.
125. Id. at 491.
126. Id. at 492.
127. Id. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
128. See Asean, supra note 14; text accompanying note 14.
129. See United States—Gambling, supra note 36, ¶ 308.
130. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp
Products, ¶ 177, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
131. John Borland, Napster Blasts Court’s Technical Meddling, CNET NEWS, Aug. 9, 2001,
http://news.com.com/Napster+blasts+courts+technical+meddling/2100-1023_3-271351.html.
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GATS does allow countries to prefer certain modes of delivery of a foreign
service over others. The principle of technological neutrality that I assay here would only
come into play when a country has committed to liberalizing a particular service with
respect to mode 1, cross-border trade. In such a case, to demand higher standards for
electronically provided services than services delivered in person is to engage in clear
discrimination. Such discrimination would likely violate the GATS national treatment
commitment132 because foreign suppliers would be at a natural disadvantage in supplying
face-to-face services since they are less likely to have representatives on the ground.
Where the discrimination against the online service acts as an effective barrier to online
supply, it could, as in United States—Gambling, violate the GATS market access
requirement.
This is an especially grave threat to net-work. After all, due to the non-face-toface nature of the medium, it is easy to challenge net-work as potentially promoting
fraud. But to insist on the complete absence of fraud on Internet-mediated services would
be to conjure a preexisting world of face-to-face transactions devoid of fraud. Fraud and
other regulatory leakages are a persistent fact of commerce and are not unique to Internet
commerce. Trade law should not allow countries to insist on a regulatory nirvana in
cyberspace unmatched in real space. Such discrimination against the electronic medium
will likely disadvantage foreign suppliers, who are less likely to have the resources to
deploy service providers on the ground.
2.

Dematerialized Architecture

Even were legal restraints on cross-border net-work entirely eliminated, local
service providers would still retain a natural advantage. Local persons are more likely to
have obtained any certifications and licenses necessary to provide a service in the
jurisdiction. They are also more likely to have access to regulations governing the
service. Equally important, the architecture of real-world transactions helps promote
security, privacy, monitoring, trust, and enforceability between parties, which in turn
fosters marketplace contracts with strangers. Handshakes, ink signatures, demeanor
evidence, reputation circulated by word of mouth, cultural and language affinities, and
comfort with the process for seeking legal redress against a local service provider (or
customer) may make local interactions more attractive than those conducted remotely,
especially cross-border.
Of course, mail order contracts became increasingly commonplace in the last half
century,133 demonstrating that face-to-face transactions are not entirely indispensable for
large scale commerce. Even more dramatically, global supply chains now dominate the
production of goods, proving the possibility of commerce across national borders, time
zones, and oceans. Yet, undergirding these global supply chains are developments in the
legal infrastructure, both between states and within states. Bills of lading and procedures
for documentary credits established a framework for shipping a good and receiving
132. GATS, supra note 9, art. XVII.
133. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 316 (1992) (noting “the mail-order industry’s
dramatic growth over the last quarter century”).
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payment. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) helped standardize shipping
terms through “Incoterms.”134 The United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) promoted “uniform rules which govern contracts for the international
sale of goods” through the Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG),
regulating the formation of a contract, the obligations owed by buyers and sellers, the
passing of risk of the good during transit, and remedies for breach.135
Many of these standards and rules cannot be applied to services: the CISG is, by
its terms, the Convention on the International Sale of Goods; shipping terms referring to
risk passing at the ship’s rail have little meaning in cyberspace; documents evidencing
the loading of a truck or ship cannot be easily adapted to products delivered
electronically.136 The principal promoters of the international legal framework for goods,
UNCITRAL and the ICC, have accordingly extended their work to electronic commerce
and services. UNCITRAL promoted an e-signature initiative that served as a model law
for the United States and other nations, helping validate contracts made electronically.137
Trade 2.0 will require electronic substitutes, where possible, not only for
signatures, but also for handshakes, facial identification, bureaucratic offices, education,
testing, and even administrative and judicial hearings. This is the dematerialization of the
services infrastructure, the systems and practices that foster trust, promote social goals,
and resolve disputes.
Net-work will flourish as the need for physical presence in order to provide a
service recedes. Regulated professions require the service provider to obtain educational
credentials, pass an examination, conform the service to certain rules, or some
combination of the above. GATS hopes to make obsolete the ritual pilgrimage to
numerous governmental offices to obtain rules and applications applicable to a particular
service. WTO member states must publish regulations governing any service covered by
their specific commitments 138 and establish enquiry points where foreign service
providers can obtain information about such regulations.139 Canada helpfully posts this
information online, 140 and many other countries provide an email contact point. 141

134. William V. Roth, Jr. & William V. Roth III, Incoterms: Facilitating Trade in the Asian
Pacific, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 731, 732-33 (1997).
135. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods pmbl., Apr.
10, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 668.
136. Certain other aspects of the legal infrastructure, such as letters of credit, arbitration, and
anticorruption laws, can be extended to net-work.
137. Model Law on Electronic Commerce, G.A. Res. 51/162, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/162 (Jan.
30, 1997) (amended in June 1998 to add to article 5); see also Electronic Signatures in Global and
National Commerce (E-Sign) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-31 (2000). In 2005, UNCITRAL
promulgated a treaty to promote cross-border electronic contracting, though no country has
ratified it thus far. United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in
International Contracts, G.A. Res. 60/21, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/21 (Dec. 9, 2005).
138. GATS, supra note 9, art. III(3).
139. Id. art. III(4).
140. Foreign Affairs and Int’l Trade Canada, Trade Negotiations and Agreements,
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/index.aspx (last visited
Apr. 19, 2009).
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Through this transparency requirement, GATS will foster trade by enabling foreign
service providers to develop the ability to conform to local rules.
The European Union’s Services Directive goes substantially further. It not only
mandates that information on service regulation be supplied electronically, 142 it also
requires member states to “ensure that all procedures and formalities relating to access to
a service activity and to the exercise thereof may be easily completed, at a distance and
by electronic means, through the relevant point of single contact and with the relevant
competent authorities.” 143 With this mandate, the European Union will lead the way
towards dematerialization, in the process establishing standards that the rest of the world
will likely use as models.
Where a service is licensed, governments should consider whether a foreign
credential should be recognized as a substantial equivalent—thus eliminating the need for
the service provider to obtain the necessary license through physical presence in a foreign
country. Certain educational processes may be harder to mimic. The magic of walking
the corridors of a law school may be difficult to recreate virtually. 144 Thus far, the
American Bar Association has not accredited any online law schools, though graduates of
online law schools may sit for the California Bar (and have done so, with a first time pass
rate to date of 40.5%).145
Even largely unregulated services will benefit from the creation of a trust
infrastructure in cyberspace, enhancing consumer confidence in the service. Systems for
providing authentication, security, and privacy will alleviate consumer concerns about
online activity. Private reputation systems have developed to allow individuals to engage
in significant trades across long distances.
Allowing aggrieved parties to an international transaction to settle disputes via the
Internet would substantially reduce impediments to trade. The WIPO-initiated domain
name dispute resolution system demonstrates the possibility of a cyber-tribunal that
efficiently processes international disputes, while dispensing with physical presentations

141. The WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade makes enquiry points, including
email addresses, available online at World Trade Org., Technical Barriers to Trade—National
Enquiry Points, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_enquiry_points _e.htm (last visited
Apr. 22, 2009), and publishes them periodically under document code G/TBT/ENQ/*. See, e.g.,
Comm. on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secretariat: National Enquiry Points,
G/TBT/ENQ/35 (Mar. 2, 2009).
142. Council Directive 2006/123/EC, art. 7(3), 2006 O.J. (L 376) 36, 53 (EC) [hereinafter
Services Directive].
143. Id. art. 8(1), at 54.
144. Cf. Harvard Law Sch. & Harvard Extension Sch., CyberOne: Law in the Court of Public
Opinion, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/cyberone/videos/CyberOne.mp4 (Fall 2006) (showing
Harvard Law Professor Charles Nesson walking into a virtual re-creation of Austin Hall).
145. Michael Ravnitzky, Online Law School’s First Grads, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 8, 2003, available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1039054542141; Concord Law School, Passing the
California Bar Examination, http://about.concordlawschool.edu/Pages/Bar_Exam.aspx (last
visited Apr. 1, 2009).
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or evidence.146 India recently established the Cyber Regulations Appellate Tribunal,147
and empowered the Tribunal to regulate its own procedures, dispensing with the national
code of civil procedure.148 While this is promising, the procedures put into place require
each person seeking redress to submit “six complete sets [of the complaint] in a paperbook form, along with one empty file size envelope bearing full address of the
respondent.” 149 Service providers themselves may demand global electronic dispute
resolution regimes—bonding themselves to accessible and reliable dispute resolution
schemes in order to increase the confidence of potential clients, and thus justifying a
higher price. Because many disputes arising out of these arrangements might arise out of
a contractual relation, such regimes might be established by contract. However, where
those contracts are form contracts provided, for example, on a website, there are reasons
to be cautious about ready enforcement of the private ordering.150
Dematerialization does not require automation; human beings would still
need, for example, to conduct conformity assessments with the regulatory standard.151
Dematerialization might also be approximated by enabling foreign service providers to
meet requirements through geographically proximate processes. Certification tests can be
administered in a variety of secure locations around the world.152
As United States—Gambling demonstrates, regulations that require a physical
presence by a foreign service provider might be subject to GATS challenge (at least
where the regulating country has committed to liberalize mode 1 trade in that service). A
country seeking to supply a service via net-work might, like Antigua, offer two claims:
(1) a violation of the national treatment obligation because a physical presence
requirement advantages local providers; and (2) a violation of the market access
commitment if a country has committed to liberalize mode 1, cross-border trade. Again,
as United States— Gambling reveals, the nation insisting on physical presence can plead
146. Laurence R. Helfer & Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The
Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141
(2001).
147. Information Technology Act, 2000, § 58, No. 21, Acts of Parliament, 2000 (India).
148. Id.
149. Ministry of Commc’ns & Info. Tech., Dep’t of Info. Tech., Cyber Regulations Appellate
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2000, http://www.mit.gov.in/default.aspx?id=311 (India) (last visited
Apr. 18. 2009); see also Moumita Bakshi Chatterjee, Cyber Tribunal May Be Expanded, HINDU
BUS. LINE, Dec. 27, 2005, http://www.blonnet.com/2005/12/27/stories/2005122703020400.htm.
150. See Margaret Jane Radin, Commentary, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and
the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (2006); Margaret Jane Radin, Lecture, Regime
Change in Intellectual Property Law: Superseding the Law of the State with the “Law” of the
Firm, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 173 (2004); Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and
the Integration of Text and Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2002); Margaret Jane Radin,
Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125 (2000).
151. But cf. JAMES E. BYRNE & DAN TAYLOR, ICC GUIDE TO THE EUCP: UNDERSTANDING
THE ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENT TO THE UCP 500, at 14-15 (2002) (observing the possibility of
automated compliance checking for electronic letters of credit).
152. The Law School Admissions Test, for example, can be taken in twenty-nine foreign
countries, including Australia, China, Egypt, and Spain. LAW SCH. ADMISSIONS COUNCIL,
REGULAR ADMINISTRATION TEST CENTER CODES (2007).
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the need to protect public morals, maintain public order, or protect life, but that plea can
be tested for a “reasonably available alternative.” 153 As the legal and technical
infrastructure of net-work grows through increased dematerialization, a physical presence
requirement will be harder to defend.
B.

Protecting Law

The footloose nature of net-work increases the likelihood that a service provider
might relocate to take advantage of regulatory environments it finds favorable.154 The
fear is that this might lead to a race to the bottom, as providers search out the jurisdiction
with minimal or even no regulation. Will net-work in regulated industries now find
refuge in offshore havens?
The bottom of such a race might well be found in the self-declared principality of
Sealand. Established on a floating platform used for British air defense during World War
II, Sealand provides “the world’s first truly offshore, almost-anything-goes electronic
data haven.” 155 Through its web hosting company, forthrightly named “HavenCo,”
Sealand offers “the ‘freedom’ to store and move data without answering to anybody,
including competitors, regulators, and lawyers.”156 Free, as in without regulation.
Does Sealand and its ilk spell the death of law? Thus far, with few exceptions
such as online gaming, net-work has not migrated en masse to offshore havens.157 Where
earlier scholars saw regulatory competition as inexorably resulting in calamitous
deregulation, today’s scholars have identified potential virtues in the process. Rather than
a race to the bottom, they predict a race to the top or, alternatively, a race to the global

153. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
154. Others have described the regulatory arbitrage made possible by the Internet. See A.
Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of Regulatory Arbitrage, in BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE 129 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson eds., 1997). Cross-border relocation to avoid
regulation is a well-worn tactic. The history of Hollywood can be traced in part to regulatory
evasion, as moviemakers such as Fox and Paramount sought to elude Thomas Edison’s patent
monopolies based in New Jersey by decamping to the other end of the continent. LAWRENCE
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 53-54 (2004) (“The film industry of Hollywood was built by fleeing
pirates. . . . California was remote enough from Edison’s reach that film-makers there could pirate
his inventions without fear of the law.”).
155. Simson Garfinkel, Welcome to Sealand. Now Bugger Off, WIRED, July 2000, at 230,
available at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.07/haven.html.
156. Id. Even HavenCo has its limits, prohibiting “spamming, obscenity, and child
pornography,” Declan McCullagh, HavenCo: Come to Data, WIRED, June 5, 2000, available at
http://www.wired.com/politics/law/news/2000/06/36756, and activities “against international law,
linked with terrorism, or contrary to international custom and practice,” Declan McCullagh, Has
‘Haven’ for Questionable Sites Sunk?, CNET NEWS, Aug. 4, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/Hashaven-for
-questionable-sites-sunk/2100-1028_3-5059676.html.
157. Sealand’s web-hosting is foundering, suffering its latest blow in the form of a fire.
Principality of Sealand, Principality Notice (June 28, 2006), http://www.sealandgov.org/notices/
pn03106.html.
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welfare-maximizing ideal.158 Regulatory competition might pressure regulators to bring
regulation to global standards or allow private parties to locate the most well-tailored
rules to govern a particular transaction. Competition might lead to the optimal
regulation,159 where optimality is defined as the minimum regulation necessary to correct
market failure. Regulatory competition “has the potential to discourage harmful
regulatory laxity as well as extreme regulatory rigor.” 160 But what we find is the
possibility of widespread regulatory evasion, not regulatory competition.
Furthermore, a race to the optimum is likely only where a company will
internalize the costs of regulation or deregulation.161 Many argue that this is the case with
respect to the choice of corporate charter, where managers’ choices of regulatory regime
will be subject to the discipline of shareholders. 162 But this happy scenario will not
always obtain with respect to services regulation. Take for example government
protections for personal information collected by corporations: because of problems of
bounded rationality (viz., limitations and biases in human cognition) and collective action
problems (viz., concentrated benefits, but dispersed costs), we should not expect private
markets to achieve efficient practices regarding the use and disclosure of customer
information.163 Companies may not fully internalize the costs of their information use and
disclosure practices and might thus choose a regulatory regime that had little or no
privacy protections. This same defect may exist with respect to a wide swath of services
regulation.
Such a race to the bottom arises because of overly liberal regimes, lacking
consumer and other protections. There is a second potential race to the bottom in net158. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956)
(arguing that jurisdictional competition to attract residents on the basis of differing tax and
benefits would produce a Pareto-superior outcome).
159. Mahmood Bagheri & Chizu Nakajima, Optimal Level of Financial Regulation Under the
GATS: A Regulatory Competition and Cooperation Framework for Capital Adequacy and
Disclosure of Information, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 507, 511 (2002).
160. Id. at 521 (citing J.D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets: An Approach
Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure Philosophies, 16 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 149, 157 (1993)).
161. Esty and Geradin identify a set of variables that affect whether regulatory competition is
likely to prove virtuous or malign. The variables include: “the scope of uninternalized
externalities; whether the information base of the particular ‘market’ is sufficient for competition
. . . ; [and] the capacity of citizens and companies to obtain and to understand information that is
relevant to their choices and options.” Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Introduction to
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION, at xix, xxv (Daniel C. Esty &
Damien Geradin eds., 2001).
162. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Ralph K.
Winter, The “Race for the Top” Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1526
(1989); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
163. Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information
Privacy and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1240-43 (2002) (discussing
lemons equilibrium in market-regulated privacy); Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and
Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2076-84 (2004).
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work, this one arising out of overly repressive regimes. Companies may submit to the
repressive demands of totalitarian regimes in order to supply services to their
populations. In the competition to supply such markets, companies might “race to the
bottom” by censoring the information they supply and even spying on the local
population in order to win governmental acquiescence. To disrupt these races to the
bottom, I offer two principles: glocalization counters the race to the deregulated bottom,
while “do no evil” counters the race to the oppressive bottom.
1.

Glocalization

Globalization, the worry goes, will sweep away local culture in favor of a mass
commercialized, homogenized world. Sociologists offer glocalization as an antidote—a
way to embrace globalization without shedding local differences. 164 Glocalization, a
portmanteau rooted in the seeming opposites “global” and “local,” refers to “the
simultaneity, or co-presence, of both universalizing and particularizing tendencies.”165 I
use it here with reference to law. Globalization of services threatens to sweep aside local
law through the use of offshore regulatory havens. Legal glocalization would require the
creation or distribution of products or services intended for a global market, but
customized to conform to local laws within the bounds of international law.166
While the concept of insisting on local law may seem anodyne, the streets of
Strasbourg and Berlin swelled recently to defend this principle.167 As originally drafted,
the European Union’s proposed Services Directive would have mandated a “country of
origin” rule within the Union, under which a European could supply her services to any
country within the European Union under the rules of her home, not host, country, at least

164. See, e.g., Roland Robertson, Comments on the “Global Triad” and “Glocalization,” in
GLOBALIZATION AND INDIGENOUS CULTURE (Inoue Nobutaka ed., 1997), available at
http://www2.kokugakuin.ac.jp/ijcc/wp/global/15robertson.html.
165. Id.
166. My definition differs from that offered by Thomas Friedman, who defines glocalization
as “the ability of a culture, when it encounters other strong cultures, to absorb influences that
naturally fit into and can enrich that culture, to resist those things that are truly alien and to
compartmentalize those things that, while different, can nevertheless be enjoyed and celebrated as
different.” THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION 282 (1999); see also THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 325 (2005) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS
FLAT] (“The more you have a culture that naturally glocalizes—that is, the more your own
culture easily absorbs foreign ideas and best practices and melds those with its own traditions—
the greater advantage you will have in a flat world.”).
167. See Graham Bowley, EU Lowers Barriers to Moves by Companies But Amendments
Weaken Services Law, Setting Off Protests, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 17, 2006, at 1. The
previous year had also seen massive demonstrations in Brussels. Demonstrators March Against
EU
Labor
Reforms,
DEUTSCHE
WELLE,
Mar.
20,
2005,
http://www.dwworld.de/dw/article/0,1564,1523785,00.html.

312

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 34: 281

in the absence of compelling public health or security rationales to the contrary.168 Thus,
a French service provider would be governed ordinarily by French law, even while
supplying services in Germany. This would apply equally to Polish plumbers and English
e-commerce providers. The head of the European Trade Union Confederation charged
that this directive would “fire the starting gun on a race to the bottom.”169 He worried that
a country of origin rule would create “flags of convenience,” as European corporations
would reincorporate in states with relatively lax regulation. 170 Such complaints had
resonance: opposition to the country of origin principle helped derail the EU Constitution
in 2005,171 and later led to that principle’s retreat within the European Union.172
Even before the Services Directive, the European Court of Justice had argued that
requiring local certification of foreign suppliers would be unduly burdensome, as such
suppliers would have to satisfy multiple authorities. The Court has repeatedly held that
member states should accept the sufficiency of the services regulation of other member
states, but generally allowed them nonetheless to derogate from this requirement based
on public interest.173 In electronic commerce, the European Union has made plain its
preference for home country regulation, requiring countries to defer to a foreign service
168. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Services in the Internal Market, at 4-5, COM (2004) 2 final (Mar. 5, 2004); see also Nicolaïdis &
Schmidt, supra note 23, at 722-23 (characterizing the draft proposal as “bold” and “sweeping”).
169. ‘Frankenstein’ Directive Resurrects EU Divisions, FIN. WK., Apr. 13, 2005,
http://www.financeweek.co.uk/item/1190 [hereinafter ‘Frankenstein’ Directive]. Another union
official opined: “The idea somehow there’s a license for companies not to observe the laws of the
country in which they are trading, that’s a step too far and I think it’s anti-democratic.” MEPs
Debate
New
Law
on
Services,
BBC
NEWS,
Feb.
15,
2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4711086.stm.
170. ‘Frankenstein’ Directive, supra note 169.
171. Opposition to ‘Frankenstein’ Law Leads to Backlash Against EU Treaty, IRISH TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2005, at 10.
172. Services Directive, supra note 142, art. 10 (allowing member states to require
authorizations of foreign services provider as long as, inter alia, such authorization is “justified by
an overriding reason related to the public interest” and “proportionate to that public interest
objective”).
173. See Case C-243/01, Tribunale di Ascoli Piceno (Italy) v. Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. I-13031
(Italian prosecution of English company for providing gambling service via Internet to Italians
without an Italian license violated freedom of services, but might be justified by imperative
reasons of public interest); Case C-384/93, Alpine Invs. BV v. Minister van Financiën, 1995
E.C.R. I-1141 (Dutch ban on cold-calling violated the freedom to provide services, but might be
justified by “imperative reasons of public interest”); Case C-76-90, Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co.
Ltd., 1991 E.C.R. I-4221, ¶ 18 (striking down German requirements that only a German
registered patent agent can provide patent renewal services because such services are of a
“straightforward nature and do not call for specific professional aptitudes” and thus German
registration is unnecessary to protect persons against bad advice). See generally Editorial
Comments, The Services Directive Proposal: Striking a Balance Between the Promotion of the
Internal Market and Preserving the European Social Model?, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 307,
309 (2006) (“[T]he case law of the Court of Justice takes the country of origin principle as its
starting point when assessing the application of the justification for restrictions on the free
movement.”).
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provider’s home regulation except where necessary and proportionate to protect the
public interest.174 Such country of origin rules might be easier to adopt in the European
Union, where supranational directives have laid the groundwork for widespread legal
harmonization. GATS, however, eschews this interpretative approach, explicitly
“[r]ecognizing the right of members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the
supply of services within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives,”175
and requiring nations to accept foreign credentials only voluntarily.176
Proponents of a country of origin principle often analogize the receipt of a crossborder net-worked service to travel to a foreign land. This raises a metaphysical question:
where does an event in cyberspace occur?177 Is the service provider traveling (virtually)
across borders into the country of the consumer? Or is the consumer of net-work
traveling (virtually) to the country of the service provider, like a tourist boarding a cruise
ship? If the metaphor of the virtual tourist holds, then that person should expect that
service to be governed by the provider’s home. 178 After all, states do not typically
interfere with a person’s consumption while abroad. 179 This question of cross-border
delivery versus virtual tourism corresponds to a GATS typology: in GATS, if a service
provider delivers a service from one country into another country, the service is classified
as mode 1; if the recipient travels to consume the service abroad, it is mode 2. In the case
of United States—Gambling, the WTO’s Appellate Body presumed without discussion
that offering online gambling entails mode 1, cross-border trade. 180 This seems wise:
characterizing cross-border net-work as consumption abroad allows consumers to opt out
of local mandatory law with the click of a mouse (rather than the more onerous boarding
of a vessel), or worse, subjects them to foreign law without the notice of entry into a
foreign jurisdiction that would normally attend foreign travel. Situating net-work firmly
in mode 1 supports the argument for glocalization—requiring the foreign service provider
to comply with local law—rather than requiring the consumer’s home jurisdiction to
relent in favor of the consumer’s purported choice of (virtual) foreign travel.
Local law, after all, reflects local mores (however imprecisely given defects in the
political process). Allowing services to be provided according to the law of the home
jurisdiction of the service provider would displace the local law of the service consumer,
174. Council Directive 2000/31/EC, On Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society
Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic
Commerce), art. 3, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1.
175. GATS, supra note 9, pmbl.
176. Id. art. VII.
177. Compare the “metaphysical” question of where an intangible such as a debt is sited, or
whether it is sited anywhere at all. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General
Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. REV. 279, 297 (1983).
178. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1369-70 (1996).
179. In certain narrow domains, such as sex tourism, countries have sought to limit
consumption abroad by their citizens. See, e.g., End Demand for Sex Trafficking Act, H.R. 2012,
109th Cong. (2005) (declaring goal of barring sex tourism).
180. See United States—Gambling, supra note 36, ¶¶ 251-52 (holding that barring the supply
of services cross-border amounts to a “zero quota” in violation of the United States’ mode 1 trade
commitments).
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subjecting that consumer to a foreign rule. Of course, where a particular local rule is
merely a default rule, subject to change contractually, there is nothing offensive per se in
the choice of a foreign rule. But with respect to mandatory law, democracy demands
glocalization, at least until “We the People” elect to subject ourselves to foreign
rules.181
Consider the effort to recast a country of origin principle as a “freedom to receive
services” principle—allowing one to receive services from whomever one chooses, under
the provider’s foreign rules. This is certainly an appealing recharacterization of
international trade in services, focusing attention on how liberalized trade empowers
consumer choice. But while globalization heightens consumer choice, it may at the same
time make the consumer vulnerable to exploitation. This is because it is nation-states,
their laws, and their courts—not nongovernmental, supranational organizations, or even
private associations—that serve as the principal protectors of consumers in today’s
world. 182 To displace national sovereignty with consumer sovereignty would be to
eliminate consumer protections in favor of “buyer beware.” Some netizens would prefer
the benevolence of system operators and businesses to national governments—but this is
likely to result in either a technocracy—rule by system operators—or a plutocracy—rule
by corporations.
Glocalization’s assertion of municipal law in the face of global information flows
stands in contrast to the world envisioned by cyberspace enthusiasts, who would deny the
applicability of local law to a universal cyberspace. 183 Glocalization simultaneously
181. In a recent book, Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu also argue in favor of national regulation
of cyberspace, but they do so principally because they believe that the state holds the monopoly
on legitimate physical coercion. They preface their book by arguing that “even for the most
revolutionary global communication technologies, geography and governmental coercion retain
fundamental importance.” JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?:
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD viii (2006). Their final chapter, titled “Globalization Meets
Governmental Coercion,” concludes: “[P]hysical coercion by government . . . remains far more
important than anyone expected . . . . Yet at a fundamental level, it’s the most important thing
missing from most predictions of where globalization will lead, and the most significant gap in
predictions about the future shape of the Internet.” Id. at 180. But as Lessig taught us, West Coast
Code can be as effective a regulator as East Coast Code. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 221 (1999). Microsoft, Cisco, and Google might well have more
power than many medium-sized countries to effect a norm in cyberspace. The question is not who
can most effectively enforce a regulation, but who can most legitimately do so. I bottom my claim
for glocalization not on the need for coercive authority, but on the need to sustain democratic rule
in a net-worked world.
182. Cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, AND
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 257 (2006) (observing that the nation-state “is the largest and most
foundational unit that still has any chance of being decently accountable to the people who live
there”).
183. See Johnson & Post, supra note 178, at 1367, 1371; David G. Post, Against “Against
Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1384-86 (2002); John Perry Barlow, A
Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/
~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh
and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind . . . . You are not welcome among us.
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confounds the desires of globe-trotting corporations, which seek to extend their markets
without the troublesome impediments of local law.184 The cosmopolitan, borderless world
promised by both business strategists and cyber-utopians seems yet remote—at least
when such a world would defeat local law. The flat world of global business185 and the
self-regulated world of cyberspace remain distant ideals.
Yet, reasserting national sovereignty in the face of net-work need not stymie
globalization. Indeed, it will strengthen globalization against a retrenching backlash.186 If
cross-border flows of information undermine our privacy, security, or the standards of
locally delivered services, they will not long be tolerated. Even the promise of more
efficient production and its concomitant cost savings might not rebuff protectionist
impulses bolstered by the emergence of well-publicized examples of cross-border network abuses. Some smaller states may well have conceded their own powerlessness in
the face of cyberspace. Taiwan, for example, has apparently brought no cases against
foreign corporations or individuals for activities (such as intellectual property
infringement) in cyberspace. The principle of glocalization would perhaps strengthen the
resolve of small states to assert their own law in cyberspace. Glocalization will also spur
workers worldwide to train according to the requirements of the world’s most demanding
jurisdictions. This may spur human capital investment throughout the world, and raise
standards worldwide.
Whether a network provider will respond to glocalization efforts by offering a
generalized service acceptable to all (a “one-size-fits-all” service), or a service tailored to
each regulatory regime (a “bespoke” service), will depend largely on the economics of
delivering variations of that service. In some cases, a net-work supplier will conclude that
a bespoke service is warranted because a tailored service supplies profits in excess of the
additional costs of tailoring. Indeed, it may be that it is often easier and cheaper to tailor a
service than a good. In some cases, however, a service provider may decide that it is not
cost-effective to do so; for example, an American digital bookseller might remove Lady
Chatterley’s Lover from its offerings worldwide rather than implement technology to
block its transfer to jurisdictions that label the book indecent. This would indeed be
unfortunate, though we might note that cyberspace is filled with those who would make
less craven decisions, willing to risk the wrath of repressive regimes to disseminate
information.187
You have no sovereignty where we gather.”). The classic response is Jack Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998).
184. See, e.g., KENICHI OHMAE, THE NEXT GLOBAL STAGE: THE CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES IN OUR BORDERLESS WORLD 21 (2005).
185. See FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT, supra note 166.
186. See Aaditya Mattoo & Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Pre-empting Protectionism in Services:
The GATS and Outsourcing, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 765, 772 (2004) (describing “political opposition
in importing countries and pressure for trade barriers” against cross-border outsourcing of
services); Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 2006 Outsourcing Bills (Oct. 2006),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/employ/outsourcing06.htm (collecting legislative efforts across the
United States to stymie cross-border services outsourcing).
187. Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (denying
preliminary injunction motion of a Swiss bank in a suit against a foreign website dedicated to
disclosing “leaks”).
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In resisting the French order in the case described in Section II.C, Yahoo argued
that that order represented French efforts to impose its law on the world; “French
imperialism,” its lawyer decried.188 Yahoo worried that tolerating the French imposition
would cause other states to follow suit, whittling down the World Wide Web into a small,
rump set of material that was acceptable to states from China, to France, to Singapore, to
North Korea. The most free information medium in the world would rapidly become its
most heavily regulated. The French court, however, satisfied itself that this was not
inevitable; that technology would permit Yahoo to offer a conforming service to French
citizens yet simultaneously offer a nonconforming service to others, with a certain margin
of error.189 An international law rule described in Subsection III.B.2 below shows that
France may only rightfully insist on applying its hate speech regulations to Yahoo’s
foreign operations where they pose a substantial harm in France.
If France believes that the effects are substantial, what responsibility do U.S.
courts have to enforce the French rule? Should a net-work provider’s home jurisdiction
act as an auxiliary of the foreign jurisdiction? As in the Yahoo case, the issue is especially
difficult if the local supplier has not done anything wrong under its home jurisdiction’s
law. In the United States, where the First Amendment bars state suppression of speech,
courts should be especially wary of enforcing a foreign order sanctioning speech. This is
especially so because enforcing that rule may cause it to spill over into the domestic
arena. The imperfection of geolocation technology means that not only will some people
on French soil receive the forbidden material after having been mistakenly identified as
not French, 190 but also that some Americans will be denied it after having been
mistakenly identified as French.
The general rule, however, should be one where states seek to assist foreign states
in enforcing their laws. The U.S. approach to recognition and enforcement is particularly
instructive. In the classic case of Hilton v. Guyot, a French person sought to recover
through U.S. courts a French judgment against U.S. parties arising out of a commercial
dispute.191 In a classic trade in goods dispute, an Irish immigrant to the United States who
had initially set up business importing Irish lace found himself at odds with the Parisian
makers of the leather gloves he imported.192 The Supreme Court held that a U.S. court
could enforce the foreign money judgment as a matter of comity, which the Court
described as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws.” Procedural differences between the two
188. Wrenn, supra note 64, at 6.
189. LICRA-May, supra note 63.
190. The French court concluded, based on a report by an expert panel, that Yahoo could
geolocate—identify the geographical location of the user—with seventy to ninety percent
accuracy, thus leaving the remaining ten percent of French users who would still be able to obtain
the illicit material from the Yahoo site. LICRA-November, supra note 71.
191. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); see also Anupam Chander, Homeward Bound, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 87-88 (2006).
192. Louise Ellen Teitz, The Story of Hilton: From Gloves to Globalization, in CIVIL
PROCEDURE STORIES 427, 449 (Kevin Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2004).

2009]

Trade 2.0

317

jurisdictions would not be enough to deny recognition, as long as the foreign jurisdiction
had subject-matter jurisdiction and offered an opportunity for a full and fair trial in an
impartial process. The Court insisted that recognition was only due when the foreign
nation whose acts were at issue offered reciprocal treatment for American acts. The
reciprocity requirement has largely fallen out of favor in U.S. jurisprudence, though
courts have refused to recognize a foreign judgment where it would be inconsistent with
local public policy.193
This Trade 1.0 case remains instructive with respect to Trade 2.0 as well: states
should assist foreign states as a matter of comity or in the hope of inducing reciprocity in
the future, but only where such assistance would not run afoul of local public policy. The
new Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, for example, would enforce
non-consumer contractual choices of one nation’s courts to hear disputes arising out of
the contract exclusively.194 At the time of writing, however, only Mexico had acceded to
the Convention. A web of states enforcing each other’s rules where consistent with local
policy will reduce the jurisdictional evasion made possible by the Internet.
Many have argued that the application of local law to cyberspace is futile. 195
Electrons, after all, are hard to corral. Efforts to stamp out information in cyberspace can
lead, against determined parties, to a global version of the arcade game Whack-AMole.196 Yet, governments have an array of techniques to assert control over cyberspace,
even if the control is imperfect.197 How might a nation seek to ensure that its laws are
observed with respect to cyberspace communications available to its citizens?
Intermediaries will play an important role for this regulation,198 though intermediaries
will often have a dangerous incentive to disable access to a wider array of material than
legally required. 199 Points of control include search engines, website hosts, Internet
routers, financial intermediaries, advertisers, Internet service providers, and the domain
name system,200 along with the net-work provider (who may have assets in a jurisdiction
193. 3 VED P. NANDA & DAVID K. PANSIUS, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN
U.S. COURTS § 20:6 (2d ed. 2009).
194. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294,
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98.
195. See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 178.
196. When Wikileaks temporarily lost its “.org” domain name due to a U.S. court order, it
immediately found mirror sites around the world from which to post its information, including
Wikileaks.be, Wikileaks.in, and The Pirate Bay; it also could be accessed directly through the IP
address of its Swedish web server, an address helpfully publicized by news accounts, including in
the New York Times. Declan McCullagh, Wikileaks Domain Name Yanked in Spat over Leaked
Documents, NEWS.COM, Feb. 19, 2008, http://www.news.com/8301-13578_3-9874167-38.html.
197. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 181, at 66-68.
198. Id. at 68; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1003 (2001); Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability,
47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239 (2005).
199. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006).
200. The decision to locate the “.com” registry in Virginia facilitates the enforcement of U.S.
judgments related to such domain names—effectively making a choice to have a “.com” domain
name, in the words of one federal court, akin to “play[ing] Internet ball in American cyberspace.”
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that will enforce orders of that court) and local consumers. Efforts to utilize various
control points to regulate information flow across the world will not prove uniformly
successful. Determined web surfers may yet find ways to access forbidden information.
Furthermore, the capacity of any country to regulate offerings from abroad will vary
widely, depending for example on whether some of the intermediaries identified above
have local assets, or assets in other jurisdictions likely to enforce that jurisdiction’s
rulings. Few, at least, will rival the United States’s capacity in this regard, including its
final control over the “.com” domain space housed on a Virginia computer.201 It is not a
coincidence that the Eastern District of Virginia and the federal appeals court therefrom
have hosted and resolved with finality many transnational domain name disputes.202
The European Union offers a model of how to leverage control over domestic
entities to control of information processing elsewhere. Recognizing that European
privacy laws are often significantly more protective than those elsewhere and recognizing
the usefulness of the outsourcing of data processing, the EU has sought to regulate the
processing of data about Europeans by service providers outside Europe. Data collectors
within Europe may send data to foreign processors only if (1) the outsourcer is in a
country that the EU recognizes as providing sufficient privacy and security safeguards
(currently, Argentina, Canada, Switzerland, and, under a weak Safe Harbor, the United
States)203; or (2) the outsourcer accepts a model contract protecting privacy.204 The model
contract requires the outsourcer to permit third party audits of its facilities and data, to
submit to European law as governing its privacy practices with respect to the information,
and to respect any related ruling of the courts of the data exporter’s home jurisdiction.205
2.

Harmonization

Glocalization raises the specter of breaking cyberspace apart into multiple legal
fragments or, worse, yoking foreign service providers into abetting local authoritarian
rule. We might label the first pressure Balkanization—the creation of borders in
cyberspace, thereby risking the advantages of global information and services sharing.

Am. Online, Inc. v. AOL.org, 259 F. Supp. 2d 449, 457 (E.D. Va. 2003) (suit by American
corporation against Korean registrant of “AOL.org”). Many newer Top Level Domains, however,
are run through registries outside the United States. For example, “.info” is now run by the
Dublin-based company Afilias, though one suspects that U.S. courts would hesitate before
describing the choice of a “.info” site as akin to playing Internet ball in Irish space.
201. Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV. 715, 758 (2003).
202. See, e.g., Cable News Network L.P. v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484 (E.D. Va.
2001) (ordering, on trademark infringement grounds, Chinese news company to surrender
“cnnews.com” domain name to American news company).
203. Council Directive 95/46, art. 25(6), 1995 O.J. (L281) 31; European Comm’n,
Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third Countries,
http://ec.europa.eu/
justice_home/fsj/privacy/thridcountries/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
204. Commission Decision 2004/915, 2004 O.J. (L385) 74.
205. Id. at Annex, cls. II(g), IV, V(c) (“Standard Contractual Clauses for the transfer of
personal data from the Community to third countries”).
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We might label the second pressure Stalinization—the imposition of the world’s most
repressive rules on cyberspace through compliant intermediaries. Balkanization itself
raises further concerns, including the following: incursions upon sovereignty, as efforts to
regulate foreign service providers lead to extraterritorial assertions of prescriptive and
adjudicative power; futility—the difficulty of stamping out undesired information in
cyberspace described above; and increasing costs of compliance with multifarious and
potentially conflicting local laws. In this section, I offer a principle to lessen the risk of
Balkanization, and in the next section I turn to the problem of Stalinization. Both
Balkanization and Stalinization counsel substantial limits on the glocalization principle,
but they do not undermine its central raison d’etre: preserving the possibility of selfregulation in a net-worked world.
To alleviate the harms of Balkanization, countries will have to engage in
harmonization in varying degrees and in various areas, and I describe this necessity in
this Subsection. This Subsection begins by describing the restraints available under
existing law on the assertion of local authority and counsels forbearance when local
policy concerns are minimally affected. Forbearance, I note, functions as a kind of weak,
ad hoc harmonization—allowing one law to regulate a multijurisdictional transaction.
More explicit and prospective harmonization efforts are also necessary to reduce the
sometimes unnecessary complications of legal variation, and this Subsection describes
this route as well, relating it to GATS.
Both international law and U.S. law206 establish significant metes and bounds for
glocalization. Common perception notwithstanding, neither jurisprudence authorizes
extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of effects alone. International law typically limits
state exercise of prescriptive (the right to legislate) and adjudicative (the right to resolve
disputes) authority over conduct outside its territory only where the effect on its own
territory is “substantial.”207 As legal scholar W. Michael Reisman describes, international
law seeks “to resolve systematically” conflicts of laws “by allocating to particular states
the competence to make or apply law to particular persons, things or events that are
simultaneously” subject to “the control of two or more states.”208 In related fashion, the

206. I focus here on U.S. law rather than on other foreign law for two reasons: (1) U.S. law
has extensive experience dealing with the problems of globalization; and, (2) it is the
jurisprudence with which I am most familiar. I hope that other scholars will test the arguments
presented here in other legal contexts.
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 18, 403 (1987). U.S. courts have
adopted this approach in interpreting U.S. statutes. See, e.g., F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004) (limiting applications of Sherman Act abroad to cases
where there is “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on domestic commerce);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (applying Sherman Act to foreign
conduct “that was meant to produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States”); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Arco Globus Int’l, 150 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1998) (refusing
to apply U.S. trademark law against foreign activity in absence of “substantial effect” on U.S.
commerce).
208. W. Michael Reisman, Introduction to JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xi, xi
(W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999).
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American Law Institute’s principles for transnational intellectual property disputes
counsel judicial coordination of related disputes in multiple fora.209
In the United States, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
restrains judicial power, limiting a state’s extraterritorial reach even in the face—quite
literally—of an explosion on that state’s soil. In the classic case of Worldwide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, involving a car that caught fire in Oklahoma, the United States
Supreme Court denied an Oklahoma court jurisdiction over that car’s New York
distributor because that distributor lacked sufficient other ties to Oklahoma. 210 Even
though the distributor could have foreseen that the car might cause injury in Oklahoma
(or anywhere in the continental United States), the Supreme Court declared the
distributor off limits to Oklahoma courts in the absence of more concerted ties to that
state. The Court declared, “Every seller of chattels [does not] in effect appoint the chattel
his agent for service of process.”211 We can recast this maxim for the digital age: every
net-work provider does not appoint electrons as her agent for service of process. (In
recent cases involving the Internet, United States circuit courts allow a state to assert
jurisdiction over a foreign person only if there is “something more” than effects alone,
typically some kind of known targeting of someone in that state.212) A tragic motorcycle
accident in California led the Court to revisit the Worldwide Volkswagen issue in the case
of Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, now in the context of a suit
between a Taiwanese tire manufacturer and a Japanese tire valve manufacturer. The
Supreme Court again repudiated the assertion of state court jurisdiction, this time because
the California court failed, inter alia, to “consider the procedural and substantive policies
of other nations.”213 As we move from Worldwide Volkswagen to the World Wide Web,
we may do well to remember the lessons learned from earlier globalizations.
The Supreme Court has observed that technological progress has spurred
interstate (and international) commerce, necessitating expansion of jurisdictional
grounds: “As technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between the

209. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING JURISDICTION,
AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES § 221 (Am. Law Inst. 2008).

CHOICE OF LAW,

210. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 288 (1980).
211. Id. at 296.
212. Yahoo Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th
Cir. 2006) (en banc) (permitting jurisdiction only where defendant “expressly aimed at the forum
state” and knew that harm “is likely to be suffered” in that state); Young v. New Haven
Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that jurisdiction requires “[s]omething more
than posting and accessibility,” and stating that jurisdiction is appropriate only where defendants
“manifest an intent to target and focus on” state residents); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 475
(5th Cir. 2002) (requiring defendant to have “knowledge of the forum at which his conduct is
directed” before assertion of personal jurisdiction); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service, 293 F.3d
707, 712 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that “because the Internet is omnipresent,” jurisdiction based on
access to information placed on the Web would eliminate geographic limits on judicial power);
Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he
requirement is satisfied when the defendant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct
targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state.”).
213. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987) (alteration in original).
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States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase.”214
Yet, the Court has refused to abandon limits on personal jurisdiction entirely: “it is a
mistake to assume that this trend heralds the eventual demise of all restrictions on the
personal jurisdiction of state courts.”215
Some scholars have argued that Congress can extend federal jurisdiction
extraterritorially without requiring purposeful availment.216 The Supreme Court itself has
been reluctant to dispense with purposeful availment on its own with respect to
defendants outside the United States. 217 Restraining assertions of jurisdiction in
cyberspace will prove crucial for reducing Balkanization or for avoiding chilling speech.
Antitrust law too has grappled with the globalization of production. The early
jurisprudential attitude was to deny any extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust law. When
asked to hear a case alleging an attempt to monopolize banana exports in Costa Rica,
Justice Holmes wrote in the 1909 case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. that
“[i]t is surprising to hear it argued that” acts outside the jurisdiction of the United States
“were governed by the act of Congress.”218 To apply U.S. law, he continued, would be
“contrary to the comity of nations.”219 But the courts and Congress came to recognize
that refusing to apply American antitrust law abroad could dramatically undermine that
law at home, as foreign anti-competitive practices would spill over into the United States.
As Harvard professor Kingman Brewster pointed out in an influential book, antitrust law
author Senator Sherman himself worried about “jurisdiction-hopping and evasion,”
advising that such problems could be met by attaching the putative evader’s property in
the United States.220 In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, a federal court of
appeals famously offered a test that sought to balance the competing interests of various
states in determining whether to assert both prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction
over alleged foreign anti-competitive acts. American lumber company Timberlane sued
Bank of America and others for actions abroad that allegedly harmed Timberlane’s
efforts to export lumber from Honduras to the United States. Judge Choy articulated a
“‘jurisdictional rule of reason’”221 that required the court to consider seven factors before
asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction: (1) “the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy”; (2) “the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of business of corporations”; (3) “the extent to which enforcement by either state
can be expected to achieve compliance”; (4) “the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere”; (5) “the extent to which there is
214. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958).
215. Id.
216. See, e.g., Wendy Perdue, Aliens, The Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A
Reassessment of Fifth Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 455
(2004). But see Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992).
217. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108-13 (plurality opinion); id. at 113-14 (majority opinion).
218. 213 U.S. 347, 355 (1909).
219. Id. at 356.
220. KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 20 (1958).
221. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.
1976) (quoting BREWSTER, supra note 220, at 446).
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explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce”; (6) “the foreseeability of such
effect”; and (7) “the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.”222 The American Law Institute largely
adopted this list of factors in its influential Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law,
but made a crucial addition: “the importance of the regulation to the international
political, legal, or economic system.”223 Thus, as markets widened across the globe, it
became necessary to extend U.S. antitrust law overseas in order to protect Americans—
but to do so in a way consistent with the needs and rights of the international community.
These cases show how the law has responded to the globalization of the
production of goods. In the cases described above, covering the diverse range of goods
subject to international trade, from automobiles and motorcycles to bananas and lumber,
the United States Supreme Court did not insist on local adjudication or local law, even
where there was harm ultimately felt within the United States. In these cases, at least, the
courts have largely avoided provincialism, favoring instead due consideration of foreign
and international interests.
This willingness to forbear in the interests of comity and the international order
will prove essential with respect to services as well. The risks of Balkanization, the
incursions upon foreign sovereignty, and the costs of compliance with multifarious and
potentially conflicting municipal laws all counsel restraint. An early U.S. governmental
study warned of the dangers of over-regulation, worried that unnecessary content
regulation of the Internet by states “could cripple the growth and diversity of the
Internet.”224 We will need an extraterritoriality jurisprudence for Trade 2.0 modeled on
Timberlane and its progeny. Of course, a multifactor standard such as the one in
Timberlane does not promise the predictability of sharp rules. Yet, such a common law
approach may be the most suited to navigating the uncertain waters that trade in networked services will bring. As Judge Choy noted in Timberlane, “[A]t some point the
interests of the United States are too weak and the foreign harmony incentive for restraint
too strong to justify an extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction.”225 Common law courts
seem far better suited to determine these points on an ex post basis than legislatures
demarcating sharp rules on an ex ante basis. A case-by-case analysis can more readily
implement the international version of the golden rule (or the Kantian categorical
imperative) applied to extraterritorial jurisdiction: a nation-state should assert jurisdiction
only when such an assertion is universalizable, that is, when it would feel comfortable
with other nation-states also asserting jurisdiction in similar cases.
I have assumed here that applying domestic law to foreign service providers
supplying services via the Web to domestic consumers is an extraterritorial assertion of
law. But should not efforts to regulate transmissions as they cross into this country be
seen as an uncontroversial exercise of intra-territorial authority? The difficulty is that the
persons who must modify their behavior are abroad; thus, the enforcement of a national
rule against such persons will require an extraterritorial change of behavior. (This would
222. Id. at 614.
223. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)(e) (1986).
224. WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 18 (1997),
available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html.
225. 549 F.2d at 609.
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not be the case if the regulation were effected only through domestic intermediaries such
as ISPs or through targeting domestic users of the foreign service, and no liability
attached to the foreign provider.) Given the direct demand to a foreign service provider,
concerns about extraterritorial application of both U.S. law and U.S. judicial power
appear relevant. Cyberspace does not allow clean demarcations of political boundaries,
with an American space here, a Brazilian space there, etc. Requiring a foreign net-work
provider to comply with local law necessarily entails a command to a party outside one’s
borders. In this sense, then, such regulation has an extraterritorial component.226
However, courts should not require a clear legislative statement of extraterritorial
intent before applying a rule to net-work sourced from outside the country. Because most
U.S. law does not have an explicit extraterritorial application mandate, requiring clear
legislative statements would simply serve to allow service providers (and perhaps
consumers) to avoid the bulk of U.S. law.
Just as U.S. law should not be asserted carelessly against foreign service providers
on behalf of domestic parties, U.S. law should not be available to foreigners without a
substantial U.S. nexus. Here an antitrust case again offers guidance. In F. HoffmanLaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., the Supreme Court said that efforts to extend U.S.
antitrust protections to foreigners smacked of “legal imperialism.” 227 “[I]f America’s
antitrust policies could not win their own way in the international marketplace for such
ideas,” the Court reasoned, we should not impose these policies on foreign countries
nonetheless. 228 The Court accordingly refused to hear the claims of foreign plaintiffs
where their foreign injuries are “independent of any adverse domestic effect.” 229 Of
course, if international law declares the defendant’s actions illegal, then allowing a suit to
proceed (for example through an Alien Torts Statute claim) would further the
international order, not undermine it.
Choice of law also restrains excessive assertions of local law—and thus excessive
parochialism. The lex fori—the law of the forum—need not have a stranglehold on the
judicial imagination. Conflict of law rules empower courts to select a foreign rule
depending on the relative interests at stake of each jurisdiction. 230 The intensity of
multijurisdictional transactions arising out of Trade 2.0 will require states to fortify such
efforts, rather than obstreperously insisting on the local rule. States must forgo an
insistence on local law where the local interest is dwarfed by the foreign interest or is
otherwise minimal. Such forbearance might be likely to attract reciprocity from sister
states. Moreover, it is necessary to alleviate the international conflicts that cyberspace
trade will generate. As with the jurisdictional calculus, courts must be sensitive to the
“needs of the interstate and international system.”231
226. As Dean Kramer writes, the term “extraterritorial” has been “used in different ways at
different times and in different contexts.” Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial
Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 181 n.9.
227. 542 U.S. 155, 169 (2004).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 164.
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(b)-(c) (1971).
231. Id. § 6(2)(a); cf. BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 616
(1963); Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining
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Sufficiently noxious assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction will be met with
blocking statutes and other retaliatory measures by sister states. Extravagant actions
against foreigners have at times drawn legal responses from the home countries of those
persons.
Forbearance acts as a weak form of harmonization. By not asserting jurisdiction,
the locality is essentially yielding to a foreign law, and in that sense allowing that this
conduct can be properly governed by that law. (This assumes, as is true of the bulk of
cases, that foreign courts seized of the issue will likely apply their own law.) Efforts to
harmonize laws across nations and standards among professional associations will prove
essential to preserve a global cyberspace in the face of national regulation. Glocalization
becomes less necessary where a state has accepted a foreign regime as satisfactory for
local purposes (this is recognition, which functions as a medium level of harmonization
because it sanctions alternative governing rules, at least for the recognized entity) or
agreed upon an international standard (this is what we might call strong
harmonization).232
Harmonization of services regulation is one of the goals of recent trade
agreements. GATS permits members to “recognize the education or experience obtained,
requirements met, or licenses or certifications granted in a particular country.”233 It goes
further to mandate that states agree on disciplines to ensure that licensing and technical
standards are “based on objective and transparent criteria” and are not unduly
“burdensome.” 234 NAFTA similarly acknowledges the possibility that a party might
recognize, “unilaterally or by agreement, education, experience, licenses or certifications
obtained in the territory of another Party or of a non-Party.” 235 ASEAN has recently
adopted mutual recognition arrangements with respect to nursing and engineering. 236
Regional recognition arrangements might pave the way for recognition of the law or
licensing of countries outside the region.237 With respect to harmonization, NAFTA also
Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1881 (2005) (focusing on
“community affiliation and the functional needs of the transnational system,” not just parochial
interests, in determining rule to be applied).
232. Reisman observes that the international community can “transcend” the challenge of
multijurisdictional competence by (1) “creating vastly expanded sectors of substantive
international law”; (2) “establishing networks of international tribunals” with exclusive
competence; and (3) “establishing private international law conventions that would allocate
competences on the basis of a specific code.” Reisman, supra note 208, at xix.
233. GATS, supra note 9, art. VII(1). See generally Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Gregory Shaffer,
Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2005).
234. GATS, supra note 9, art. VI(4).
235. NAFTA, supra note 11, art. 1210(2).
236. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Agreements and Declarations,
http://www.aseansec.org/19087.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
237. The United States has recently begun to recognize an international accounting standard
without requiring foreign companies to reconcile their accounts to American accounting
standards. However, one major recognition scheme, the Multijurisdictional Jurisdiction
Disclosure System between Canada and the United States, introduced in 1991, has been an
experiment that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has not yet extended to other
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encourages the parties to “develop mutually acceptable standards and criteria for
licensing and certification of professional service providers.”238
This will require harmonization projects, not only for the procedural aspects of
transnational net-work described in connection with the dematerialization described
above, but also in substantive areas as well. A dramatic recent example of a
harmonization project shows the possibilities: the SEC recently permitted certain foreign
issuers of securities in the U.S. markets to use International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) accounting standards without reconciling them to the Generally
Accepted Accounting Standards widely utilized in the United States.239 The SEC now
proposes to require certain American companies to use IFRS as well domestically. This
move to harmonize our rules seems a natural result of recognition because it would
otherwise give a foreign company the option to choose between two different standards
(the American standard or the recognized foreign or international standard), leaving an
American company in a disadvantageous position of having only one choice (the
American standard). U.S. recognition of foreign judgments jurisprudence is similarly
permissive, allowing recognition even where a foreign court’s procedures differ from
ours.240 This recognition jurisprudence, of course, applies to foreign judicial judgments,
not foreign certifications and standards.
Moving towards international standards for certain services may involve
deference to the results of technocratic legal processes. Some have critiqued such
transnational processes as undemocratic, but I have argued elsewhere that the voluntary
nature of national acquiescence to such processes makes them compatible with
democracy.241
Trade 1.0, too, has involved extensive efforts to harmonize national standards.
The WTO’s Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) urges states to use
international standards where consistent with regulatory aims, obliging states to give
“positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other
Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that

countries, not even the United Kingdom. Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of Primary Public
Securities Markets, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 80-86 (2000).
238. NAFTA, supra note 11, Annex 1210.5, § A.2 (“Professional Services”).
239. Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance
with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP,
Securities Act Release No. 8879, Exchange Act Release No. 57,026, 73 Fed. Reg. 986 (Jan. 4,
2008). For a list of countries adopting IFRS, see Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Use of IFRS by
Jurisdiction, http://www.iasplus.com/country/useias.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
240. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Ashenden, 233 F.3d 473
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding that foreign judicial procedures need only be fair in a broad international
sense).
241. Compare Paul B. Stephan, International Governance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 237, 238 (2000) (“The investment of lawmaking authority in multilateral international
bodies . . . shrinks the realm of democratic public decision-making . . . .”), with Anupam Chander,
Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1196 (2005) (rebutting claims that there exists a
“democratic deficit at the international level”).
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these regulations adequately fulfill the objectives of their own regulations.”242 But these
obligations are restricted to goods; the TBT explicitly excludes services from its ambit.243
WTO negotiators should seek to expand the TBT to cover services.
Even with the glocalization I describe, the Internet shall offer the world’s most
important platform for regulatory competition. In the face of this competition, states may
modify their own laws, finding that their laws are unnecessary, ineffective, or otherwise
inferior to foreign laws. Services regulations are especially likely to undergo
rationalization, as they have never before faced foreign competition. Industry and
consumer groups will establish sets of best practices and global standards in certain
services, and governments may defer to such standards. Governments will find it in their
own interests to seek international coordination because of the difficulty of finding
national solutions to global problems.244 Equally important, private parties are seeking to
establish transnational rules and standards that will govern parts of Trade 2.0.245 We are
likely to witness the emergence, in certain domains, of a new lex mercatoria, cobbled
together through the common law, private coordination, statutory convergence, and treaty
harmonization, thereby reducing Balkanization, incursions on sovereignty, and costs of
global legal compliance. In yet other domains, there is likely to exist a preference for
legal diversity, or at least disagreement on where to find legal harmony.
Is harmonization simply a concession to the unruly, unregulable global Internet?
Is it the polar opposite of glocalization—the abandoning of local law in favor of foreign
rules (including foreign anything goes absence of rules)? No, harmonization requires the
deliberate decision of a polity or of the appropriate standards bodies.
Much of the jurisprudence I have surveyed is American. But the demonstration of
forbearance by even the mightiest country in the world should stand as example for the
rest of the world. The United States will also have to set an example by engaging
vigorously in harmonization projects.
3.

Do No Evil

Because foreign net-work providers lie beyond the easy reach of totalitarian
governments, they can provide a crucial channel to disseminate suppressed information.
Yet, in the wrong hands, the Internet can bring the specter of a pernicious Big Brother
closer than ever possible in Orwell’s time.246 Dissident pamphleteers who might have hid
behind the anonymity of discreetly placed writings may find their tracks harder to hide in
cyberspace. When allied with willing Internet service providers, websites, software
242. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 2.4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 122.
243. Id., annex 1, pmbl. (“[S]ervices are excluded from the coverage of this Agreement.”).
244. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1357 (2003) (“[A]s capital markets and currency markets have
become more globalized, the ability of regulators in a particular country to regulate domestic
firms has declined significantly.”).
245. Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR.
PUB. POL’Y 627 (2006).
246.
See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
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providers, and financial intermediaries, a government can gain an omniscience heretofore
unknown. 247 Foreign service providers might yield to political and economic pressure
from the government and, instead of providing channels for communicating suppressed
information, assist the state in rooting out dissidents. China, for example, has relied in
part on evidence gleaned from online activities to identify and jail political dissidents.
Glocalization does not justify the extension of oppressive laws to foreign service
providers. Glocalization’s premise, after all, is that people should be able to choose their
own law through their duly elected national organs, not the preferences of distant service
providers. It thus does not support a requirement to tailor one’s service to the demands of
an unelected, totalitarian state.
But when a totalitarian state has the wherewithal to insist on its repressive rule,
even against a foreign net-work supplier, must that foreign supplier simply withdraw?
While allowing one to claim an ethical high ground, a policy requiring disengagement
carries certain risks. If corporations from countries with strong human rights standards
walk away from oppressive states, corporations with fewer ethical constraints may step
into the breach. According to a recent account, “[i]n Internet search, for example, Baidu
openly embraces the Chinese government’s regulation of free speech on China-hosted
Web sites, while Google and others have struggled to balance those rules with Western
opposition to censorship.”248 Furthermore, because computer censors are both imperfect
and prone to countermeasures, Chinese individuals can still use them to garner and
communicate information subject to repression. At the same time, however, given the
fact that China may now have more Internet users than any other country in the world,
the economic pressures to capitulate to repressive demands are enormous.249
Perhaps it is possible to be engaged yet not advance the cause of state repression.
One minimal principle that net-work providers should adopt is “Do no evil.” Google has
famously adopted a variant of imperative as a corporate principle (though some have
charged that it has failed to live up to it in connection with China).250 (For its part, Yahoo
has adopted the inverse, more demanding, formulation: “Yahoo For Good.”251)
But what does it mean to not do evil?
Consider Google’s own actions in China. In 2006, Google launched a Chinese
language version of its site that would, unlike its previous Chinese language version, be
hosted from servers in China itself. Access to Google’s servers outside China had been
uncertain and slow, due in part or whole to Chinese blocking, and this move would allow
247. There is a horrifying information technology precedent: In 2001, a Roma group sued
IBM, claiming that IBM custom-designed punchcard machines and forms that assisted in Nazi
genocide. IBM argued that its German subsidiary had been taken over by the Nazis, and in 2006,
a Geneva Court rejected the case for exceeding the statute of limitations. Associated Press, Swiss
High Court Rejects Holocaust Suit vs. IBM, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 20, 2006, at E2.
248. Loretta Chao & Ethan Smith, New Tune: Google Aims To Crack China With Music Push,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2008, at A1.
249. China Tops World in Internet Users, CNN.COM, Jan. 14, 2009, http://e.a.cnn.net/2009/
TECH/01/14/china.internet/index.html.
250. Google Inc., Our Philosophy, http://www.google.com/intl/en/corporate/tenthings.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2009) (listing as one of ten corporate principles, “You can make money
without doing evil.”).
251. Yahoo! for Good, http://forgood.yahoo.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
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Google to expand its presence in China. In moving its servers to China, Google
abandoned its Safe Server Strategy,252 presumably for economic advantage. With servers
now on Chinese soil, Google must follow Chinese governmental mandates for censoring
results. Google, however, took a number of steps to lessen the risk of doing evil: (1) it
informed Chinese users of Google.cn when their search results were censored; (2) it
continued to offer its uncensored services through the Google.com site, whose servers are
located outside China; and (3) it did not offer services through its Chinese Google site
that allowed users to create content, such as blogs and email. 253 The last condition
suggests that Google structured its direct Chinese presence to avoid learning information
about dissident activity, information that it might, under Chinese law, be required to
divulge to authorities. Chinese bloggers and other Chinese content providers would have
to use Google’s foreign servers, which helpfully allow that data some protection through
the Safe Server Strategy. It thus tried to avoid falling into the trap into which Yahoo fell,
and which subjected Yahoo to the lawsuit it faced in a San Francisco federal court.
But what if Google’s Mountain View headquarters received an order from China
to turn over incriminating information about a political dissident held on Google’s
computer servers in California? Liberal countries wishing to strengthen the Safe Server
Strategy might require that companies not turn over personal identifying information to
foreign authorities where that information might be used for political, religious, or social
persecution in violation of universal human rights norms.254
We might understand “do no evil” as a kind of Pareto principle, where the
provider must make no one worse off by its action. 255 According to this measure,
Google’s strategy seems largely non-evil, at least on its face. After all, Google’s delivery
of censored information on Google.cn does not reduce the information that individuals

252. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. A bill in Congress would bar exactly this. Jim
Hopkins, Bill Would Keep Servers Out of China, USA TODAY, Feb. 12, 2006, at B3.
253. David P. Baron, Case, Google in China, HARV. BUS. PUBL’G, Nov. 15, 2006, available at
http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/relay.jhtml?name=itemdetail&id=P54; Frank Dai,
Google’s
China
Problem,
GLOBAL
VOICES
ONLINE,
June
10,
2006,
http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/2006/06/10/china-googles-china-problem.
254. The Global Online Freedom Act of 2007, currently under consideration in Congress,
adopts a different approach. It would: (1) prevent U.S. companies from locating servers in China
if the servers collected any personally identifying information (§ 201); (2) require the U.S.
Department of Justice to determine whether a foreign request for personal information should be
honored (§ 202); and (3) require U.S. companies to inform the U.S. State Department the details
of all foreign censorship (§§ 203-04). Global Online Freedom Act, H.R. 275, 110th Cong. (2007).
The ban on locating servers in China would leave an opening for Chinese and other corporations
to fill the void; such corporations may have fewer qualms about assisting state repression. The
requirement to inform the U.S. government of foreign censorship rules would seem unlikely to
produce useful information—and would instead make it easy for a foreign government to cast
American corporations as “CIA spies.”
255. Worse off, here, would be defined in terms of human rights, not utility. Otherwise there
could be no possibility of a Pareto improvement from Google’s actions as Google’s increase in
market share would come at the expense of other suppliers, whose utility would be thereby
reduced.
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might have otherwise obtained.256 At least one worrying possibility remains, however:
Google China might be required to disclose the search terms that Chinese citizens use,
and such search trails might help incriminate these citizens in dissident activity. Yet
another problem exists, more clearly in violation of a Pareto interpretation of the “do no
evil” mandate: Google invests in Chinese media companies that do allow user-generated
content and which presumably follow governmental mandates to disclose information
about the source of such content. Investments from companies such as Google help
provide capital for such enterprises. Can corporations escape evil by becoming
shareholders in controversial enterprises rather than supplying the service directly?
Not doing evil does not mean that one is doing good, and thus is not in itself a
sufficient criterion for corporate action. Yet, it does offer a minimum criterion for
appraisal, more so when interpreted through a more definitive interpretation like the
Pareto principle.
Stung by criticism for their involvement in Chinese censorship, Yahoo, Google,
and Microsoft are collaborating with Human Rights Watch and other nongovernmental
and educational organizations to develop a set of principles to respond to “government
pressure to comply with domestic laws and policies in ways that may conflict with the
internationally recognized human rights of freedom of expression and privacy.”257 Such
principles might well give further precision to the obligation to do no evil.
Once we recognize Google as a service provider engaged in an information
service export, yet another option appears: a WTO claim to dismantle impediments to the
services of Google and other similar suppliers. The WTO system does not currently seem
to permit the WTO to order a local regulation dismantled because it runs afoul of human
rights law.258 However, a review of China’s GATS accession schedule reveals a broad
array of commitments to liberalize mode 1, cross-border trade, including in professional
services.259 China promises both market access and national treatment for many services
delivered cross-border. However, the schedule limits liberalization of “on-line
information and database retrieval services” to joint ventures, with a maximum foreign
participation of thirty percent.260 A note requires “[a]ll international telecommunications
services . . . [to] go through gateways established with the approval of China’s
telecommunications authorities.”261 The requirement that such services must go through
approved gateways cannot, however, camouflage discriminatory measures or even
impediments to market access. Such gateways function like customs houses: insufficient
256. Moreover, the censorship is imperfect. See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman,
Empirical
Analysis
of
Internet
Filtering
in
China
(Mar.
20,
2003),
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china.
257. Global Network Initiative, http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org (last visited Apr. 18,
2009).
258. Joost Pauwelyn, Human Rights in WTO Dispute Settlement, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 205, 206 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005) (“[I]t is . . . out of the
question that within the present system a WTO panel would examine, say, a claim of violation
under the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”).
259. See Working Party Report, On the Accession of China—Schedule of Specific
Commitments on Services, WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2 (Oct. 1, 2001).
260. Id. at 17.
261. Id.
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staffing at a customs house could be grounds for a WTO claim. Because they rely on
highly subjective and inconsistent judgments, Chinese actions regulating information
might also run afoul of the GATS transparency obligation. 262 It is difficult to know
whether Google or another entity would win a GATS claim against Chinese actions that
interfered with cross-border supply of net-work, but it is important to recognize the
possibility of such a claim. Such claims may soon be tested: the United States has
charged China with failing to live up to its GATS obligations by requiring content review
and other administrative hurdles before permitting the downloading of music (and other
audiovisual material) from Apple’s iTunes store and similar services.263 The European
Union and the United States have filed requests for consultations with respect to Chinese
state media controls on the dissemination of financial information. 264 Because GATS
deals with impediments to information services, it will, somewhat unexpectedly, impact
Chinese state media controls.
Whatever the outcome of the GATS complaints against China, we must seek to
nurture a corporate consciousness among information service providers of their role in
facilitating either liberation or oppression. Goods manufacturers have at times adopted
corporate codes of responsibility, appointed corporate responsibility officers, and bonded
themselves through independent monitors. Similarly, corporate counsel to international
services providers must include human rights in their bailiwick, if not to avoid doing evil,
at least to avoid being subject to suit or consumer or shareholder boycott. Yahoo has
established a “cyber dissident fund” administered by prominent Chinese dissident Henry
Wu to aid people jailed there for their political cyber-activities. 265 Without proper
preparation, information services providers will find themselves always at risk of being
yoked into the service of regimes that both repress information and gather information in
the cause of repression. Alongside mergers and acquisitions counsel and privacy lawyers,
Silicon Valley and Bangalore companies should add human rights lawyers and trade
counsel.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A new generation of traders has arrived on the wings of the Internet. These
diverse traders include multinational corporations and individuals working from their
kitchen table. They bring together Old and New Worlds, metropole and periphery, in
ways never before imaginable. Via electronic networks, Indians tutor Koreans to speak
English,266 Koreans draw cartoons for Japanese animation studios, and Ghanaians process

262. Working Party Report, On the Accession of China, ¶ 306, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (Oct. 1,
2001).
263. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; Bradley S. Klapper, Associated Press, US
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264. See supra note 4.
265. Yahoo Creates Fund for Chinese “Cyber Dissidents,” FRANCE24.COM, Apr. 3, 2008,
http://www.france24.com/en/20080403-yahoo-fund-cyber-dissident-internet-china.
266. Cho Jin-seo, Indians To Teach English via Internet, KOREA TIMES, Aug. 3, 2007,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2007/08/123_7682.html.
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citations for quality of life offenses in New York City.267 For their part, Silicon Valley
firms seek to become the intermediaries for the world. A Londoner might download a
Nigerian novel from Amazon.com, write reports using Microsoft’s online enterprise
software, further customer relationships via Salesforce.com, and manage London stocks
investments via Fidelity.com. A resident of Shanghai might learn about Chinese history
through Yahoo, organize a party via Evite, keep in touch with friends via Facebook,
purchase tickets for a local concert on Tickets.com, find a date on Match.com, participate
in the user-created world of Second Life, store emails and photos on Google’s servers
and health records on Microsoft’s HealthVault, all the while humming along to the latest
iTune by a U.S. pop star. Law should facilitate such global interactions, but it should do
so without jeopardizing the capacity of peoples to govern themselves.
Like all new forms of trade before it, cyber-trade will have profound effects on
lifestyles, livelihoods, and relationships; improving the efficiency of production;
transmitting the latest technologies and practices; and increasing human fellowship and
understanding. At the same time, this net-worked world poses risks for cultural norms,
privacy, security, and even human rights. Because of the global nature of cybertransactions, normative conflicts are likely to arise between democratic and authoritarian
regimes, but also between democratic ones inter se. We must protect local control of
global Internet trade without jeopardizing either human rights or the World-Wide nature
of the Web. Globalization with a human face will require us to manage cyber-trade to
allow us to engage with the world, yet at the same time not to feel that we are at the
world’s mercy.

267. Robert F. Worth, In New York Tickets, Ghana Sees Orderly City, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2002, at A1 (quoting Ghanaian employee reviewing citations for New York City municipal code
violations: “‘I am very used to the rules and regulations of New York now . . . . So I think I can
live there’”).

